WORLD MARITIME UNIVERSITY
Malmö, Sweden

CONFLICTING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
By

JEAN VER PUGAL PIA
Republic of the Philippines

A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
in

MARITIME AFFAIRS
(MARITIME ADMINISTRATION)

2003
© Copyright Jean Ver Pugal Pia, 2003

DECLARATION
I certify that all the materials in this dissertation that is not my own work has been
identified, and that no material is included for which a degree has been previously
been conferred on me.
The contents of this Dissertation reflect my own personal views, and are not
necessarily endorsed by the University.

Atty. Jean Ver Pugal Pia
01 September 2003

Supervised by:

LCDR Maximo Q Mejia Jr PCG (GSC)
Lecturer, Maritime Administration/MSEP
World Maritime University

Assessor:

Dr. Proshanto K. Mukherjee
ITF Professor of Maritime Safety
Course Professor, Maritime Administration/MSEP
World Maritime University

Co-Assessor:

Mr. Galo Carrera Hurtado
Honorary Consul
Consulate of Mexico in Nova Scotia, Canada

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
“At times our own light goes out and is rekindled by a spark from another person. Each
of us has cause to think with deep gratitude of those who have lighted the flame within
us.”
– A. Schweitzer

I like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to two great and generous institutions for
making it possible for me to pursue a Master of Science degree in Maritime Affairs
(Maritime Administration) here at WMU – the Nippon Foundation of Japan/Ship and
Ocean Foundation (SOF) for granting me the Sasakawa Fellowship Award and the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) for allowing me to take 17-months official leave
in order to pursue this academic endeavour. Special mention goes to the kindness
and magnanimity of Mr. Yohei Sasakawa and Capt. Eisuke Kudo. Thanks are also
due to Atty. Oscar M. Sevilla, Administrator, Mrs. Elenita C. Delgado, Deputy
Administrator for Planning, Atty. Lamberto V. Pia, Deputy Administrator for
Operations, and Atty. Gloria J. Victoria-Bañas, Director of the Franchising Office, all
of the MARINA, for strongly endorsing my scholarship. They have been my mentors
whose examples I have tried to emulate in both my work and studies.
Sincere appreciation goes to Dr. Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Course Professor
of Maritime Administration (MA) and Maritime Safety and Environmental Protection
(MSEP) for unselfishly imparting his expertise to us. He has been a source of
inspiration.
I am also grateful to Lieutenant Commander Maximo Q. Mejia, Jr., PCG, for
his patience in guiding and encouraging me in spite his heavy workload as Lecturer
at

WMU

and

Ph.D.

candidate

at

Lund

University.

His

comments

and

recommendations are indeed invaluable.
A special note of thanks must also be extended to our two gracious WMU
librarians Ms. Susan Wangeci-Eklöw and Ms. Cecilia Denne for patiently helping me
with my research.
Sincere appreciation is extended to Ely and Therese Åhlander and Kjell
Kurtsson; Linda and Bose Sorensson; Linda and Kjell Crebello; Linda and Manny
Hilario; Claire Björnbäck; Piding Lövgren; Nancy, Kenneth and Atlas Sandevi; Mely,
Ador, and Lala Curbi; the whole Filipino community in Malmö; my Swedish hosts Lars
& Vivi-Anne Örtegren; my sister-friends, Inga Bartuseviciene from Lithunia, Janeta

iii

Toma from Romania, and Jabeth S.J.A. Dacanay; Jo Pielago, Caloy Portus and Sam
Batalla of the MARINA; Lydia Pacheco of NMP; Bong and Anna Villanueva, Allan
dela Vega, Joeven Fabul, Doy Punzalan, Belay Velasco, Lito dela Cruz, Jerry Nibre,
Aaron Reconquista, Bay Ybañez, Rudy Isorena and Edmund Tan of the PCG. They
have been the closest there is to family while we are here.
To my classmates in Maritime Administration and my colleagues who
comprise Class of 2003, my thanks for not making our class lectures dull during our
four semesters together. I will forever treasure their friendship.
Thanks to my dearest best friends and constant travel companions, Dr. Ching
Battung, Atty. Aimee Mendoza, Atty. Eden Lagao and Atty. Karen Cas, and buddies
Kuya Mon Hernandez, Ate Chile Elvira, Louie delos Santos and Jessie Supangan
were constant source of strength.
Members of my family in the Philippines have been an undying source of love,
inspiration and support: my parents (Lamberto and Zenaida), brothers (Ver John and
Ian Ver), sisters (Jessehan and Rachel), nephew (Raian Daniel): My utmost gratitude
for their immeasurable love, support, constant encouragement and prayers. Thanks
to all of them for cheering me up while I was battling the rigours of academic work
and the loneliness of being away from them.
Finally, I would like to thank two loved ones who have dedicated their WMU
dissertation to me. One referred to me as “one of his four jewels” and the other
referred to me as a “rare soul”. They have inspired me to choose the same path of
doing this work. Without their fervent prayers, incomparable love and God’s abundant
blessings, my 17-months study here in Malmö would have been much more difficult.
To both of them, I return the favour and lovingly dedicate this humble work.

iv

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: Conflicting Territorial Claims in the South China Sea
Degree

:

MSc

The dissertation is a study of the conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea.
A brief look was taken at the geopolitics in the South China Sea to pave the way to a
discussion of the significance of interest of the claimant states in the South China
Sea in terms of natural resources, strategic passageway for commercial and military
vessels, and as a baseline for EEZ and continental shelf.
The justification for the territorial claims of the claimant states were investigated with
a view of ascertaining which of them has the best claim to the islands, islets, rocks,
cays, shoals scattered throughout the South China Sea. It was found that
justifications were quite thin in view of pronouncement in line of cases on the
importance of effective occupation for recognition of their claim.
Prior to the analysis of the claims of each claimant state, a background of the claims
are made as well as the legal aspects with applicable provisions of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea were discussed. The question of
asserting the sovereignty was thereby found to be an obstacle to the resolution of
the dispute because of its seeming non-negotiability and the sensitivity shown by the
states to this subject matter.
Approaches to resolving the dispute and negotiating an agreement are explored.
The joint cooperation and development approach which is seen as the most feasible
and appealing to the claimants was thereby proposed. Confidence building
measures (CBMs) like the Indonesian-initiated workshop are discussed as a
background while three (3) models for resource development agreements were
evaluated to see the possibility of drafting a similar instrument.
The concluding chapters summarize the study and briefly discuss the inadequacy of
the mechanism and framework in the 1982 LOS Convention to be made a basis of
the solution of the disputes due mainly to the multilateral character and complexity
of this dispute.
KEYWORDS
: Confidence Building Measures, Continental Shelf,
Delimitation of Claims, Dispute Resolution, Effective Occupation, Exclusive
Economic Zone, Joint Resource Development, Sovereignty, Territorial Claims
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“These quirks of geology, flyspecks on the map, barely protruding above water
do more than break the calm of the sea and create numerous hazards for
sailors.”
- Monique Chemillier-Gendreau1

The littoral states of the South China Sea are beset with regional issues and
concerns ranging from the delineation of archipelagic baselines, to the
ascertainment of the parameters for the exercise of the right of passage through
straits, to the delimitation of boundaries between or among states with overlapping
claims to jurisdiction over maritime space and to competence over marine
resources.2
Of these regional concerns, the issue of maritime boundary delimitation is
the most problematic as it covers the configuration of overlapping claims to
sovereignty over an assortment of islands, islets, cays and rocks scattered
throughout the length and breadth of the South China Sea. The focus of attention
became more intense when it was suggested that substantial reserves of petroleum

1

Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, “Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands”, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2000.
2
Yann-Huei Song, “United States and territorial disputes in the South China Sea: a study of ocean
law and politics”. Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies. Maryland, USA: School of Law
University of Maryland, 2002, No. 1-2002(168) at p. 25.

and natural gas exist beneath its seabed. This is in addition to the fact that it is
already recognized as a rich fishing ground as well as a strategic waterway.
This study proceeds in six parts. After the introductory Chapter, the
geopolitics of the South China Sea will be discussed in Chapter 2 providing therein a
geographical, economic and political description of the area for a further
understanding of the disputed territory. The importance of control in the South China
Sea will be discussed not only in terms of economic and political considerations
involving development of potential hydrocarbon resources but also on the potential
for these islands to be used as base points from which states could extend their
claims to exclusive jurisdictional competence over the waters and resources of the
South China Sea.

More importantly, these claims on territorial sovereignty and

extended maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea region have an impact on the
national security and political stability of states.
These developments led claimant states to organize and refine their legal
positions to support the validity of their claims in order to provide justification and
ultimately international recognition for their respective territorial and jurisdictional
claims. Literature3 reviewed for this research examined historical bases asserted by
each of the claimants to justify their conflicting claims to territorial sovereignty.
These historical bases propounded by each of the claimants will be summarized in
Chapter 4 as a background. This will clarify why on the basis of the concepts of
international law, there has been an insistence on determining which of the disputing
states has the best claim to title over the islands. An analysis on the tenability of the
legal arguments propounded by each of the claimants will thereafter be conducted in
Chapter 5.
It will be shown that reliance on international law concepts to buttress their
claims to sovereignty did not help to bring peace to the region but had in fact served
to support unilateralism as a preferred mode of State action. The claimants have
considered unilateral state actions as the more decisive and effective method to
3

Marwyn S. Samuels, “Contest for the South China Sea”. New York and London: Methuen, 1982;
Gerardo Martin C. Valero, “Spratly Archipelago: Is the question of sovereignty still relevant? A
roundtable discussion“, Quezon City, Philippines: Institute of International Legal Studies University
of the Philippines Law Center, 1993; and, Christopher C. Joyner, “The Spratly Islands dispute in the
South China Sea: problems, policies, and prospects for diplomatic accommodations”, 1999, Online
at http://www.stimson.org/japan/pdf/cbmapspratly.pdf July 09, 2003).

2

assert sovereignty. For instance, there has been a mad scramble by these states to
extend their maritime competences by grabbing a piece of territory, specifying their
maritime limits and granting concessions or licensing projects within the area claims,
since much premium had been placed on the concept of effective occupation of the
claimed territory. This is best exemplified by each claimant maintaining a military
presence in at least one of the islands to the archipelago. This militarization of the
area causes grave concern as this can lead to a volatile atmosphere that can trigger
a conflict made apparent by repeated incidents of arrests and counter-arrests of
vessels by agents of competing governments. Appendix A, which refers to the
military clashes in the South China Sea over the past two decades, provides a
summary.
Notwithstanding this alarming scenario and the frequent reference to the
South China Sea as a regional “powder keg”, the possibility of a full-scale war is
remote for the time being. Multilateral attempts have been made to reach a
resolution of all the competing claims to islands in the South China Sea by exploring
alternative approaches for the settlement of their conflicting claims in fora such as
the workshops Indonesia initiated as a confidence-building measure, which
hopefully will lead to a joint cooperation agreement. This is an indication that the
states are receptive to the possibility of settlement of their conflicting claims through
a regional response. Other approaches to resolving or minimizing the conflict, as
well as generation of new and effective arrangements that shall address each of the
concerns of the claimant states, and at the same time share in the allocation and
utilization of a common ocean resource if such a goal is achievable will be explored
in Chapter 6.
The need for sensible solutions to ease the tensions between several
countries that claim all or portions of the South China Sea cannot be
overemphasized. This study aims to contribute to this end. Assessment of
geopolitical and legal nuances of disputes in the South China Sea was conducted
with a view to proposing measures that might contribute to the resolution of the
competing claims in the region. This is in reference to the provision of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention) for State
parties “to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, all issues
relating to the law of the sea”.

3

Three model agreements for resource development will then be evaluated in
Chapter 6 to see if a similar instrument can be negotiated for the South China Sea.
This will be in compliance with another 1982 LOS Convention provision, recognizing
the “desirability of establishing, with due regard for the sovereignty of all states…the
equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living
resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment”.
Chapter 7 contains the summary and conclusions for this study.

4

CHAPTER 2
GEOPOLITICS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
“It is understandable that seafarers should take interest in them in order to
give them a wide berth. It is conceivable that meteorologists should scrutinize
their role in massive disturbances to the sky and sea. Yet for jurists to take an
interest in these islands, home to rats, turtles and cyclones and cloaked in
torrid heat for part of the year, can only be understood once we unveil the
prodigious strategic and economic interests they represent in the latest game
of geopolitics.”
- Monique Chemillier-Gendreau

Geography,

demography,

resource

potential

and

distribution,

and

technological development are some of the factors which are important to the study
of ocean law and policy. Studies involving territorial and maritime jurisdictional
disputes in the South China Sea cannot help but provide a geographical description
of the territories on the strategic, political and economic interests represented by
these territories. For one, it is knowledge of these facts and it is within this milieu
which influences the policies of decision makers of countries concerned.
Geographical and other environmental factors, such as the strategic importance of
the existing chokepoints, the dependence upon the sea for major marine
transportation routes, the existence of islands along the coast, the potential
abundance of living and non-living resources, and the demographic, cultural,
economic and historical conditions have been considered by decision makers in
important national policies concerning the South China Sea.4

4

Supra, Footnote 2 at p. 15.

5

Figure 2.1 Map of the South China Sea Islands with its littoral states.5

5

online: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/schina_sea_88.jpg (August 05, 2003).

6

Second, the existence of transnational resources has created opportunities
for cooperation and community betterment. Marine resources, including fish, seabed
minerals, and petroleum within the 200-nautical miles exclusive economic zone
(EEZs) of the Asian and Pacific countries are a resource frontier with possibilities for
improving the life of the masses. However, these resources likewise create
possibilities of international competition and conflict, especially international conflict
as will be expounded in the next Chapter.6
The South China Sea stretches in the southwest to the northeast direction.
Its southern border is 3° south latitude between south Sumatra and Kalimantan
(Karimata Straits) or 1° north latitude, making it an area of about 648,000 square
nautical miles (about 1,2000,000 square kilometres).7 Its northern border is the
Strait of Taiwan from the northern tip of Taiwan to the Fukien coast of China.8 The
South China Sea encompasses a portion of the Pacific Ocean stretching roughly
from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the southwest to the Strait of Taiwan
(between Taiwan and China) in the northeast.
The South China Sea is semi-enclosed, as defined under Article 122 of the
1982 LOS Convention, with ninety percent of its circumference rimmed by land.9 It
encompasses a portion of the Pacific Ocean stretching roughly from Singapore and
the Strait of Taiwan (between Taiwan and China) in the northeast.10 As shown in
Figure 2.1, the following are the littoral countries in the South China Sea: the
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand; the Indochinese

6

Mark J. Valencia and Lim Tek Ghee, “Natural resources of South-East Asia: Conflict over natural
resources in South-East Asia and the Pacific”, Singapore: Oxford University Press Pte. Ltd., 1990,
pp. 5-6.
7
Hal Olson, “Marine Traffic in the SCS”, Ocean Yearbook, vol. 12, 1996, p. 17 gives the area for the
South China Sea, including the Gulf of Thailand and the Gulf of Tonkin as 1,000,000 square miles;
Heineman World Atlas (1995) gives the area as 800,000 square kilometres (310,000 square miles);
and the International Hydrographic Bureau gives the SCS, without the area of the Gulf of Thailand
and Tonkin as 959,160 square nautical miles. For HWA’s figure, see Christopher C. Joyner, “The
Spratly Islands Dispute; Rethinking the Interplay of Law, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics in the SCS,”
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 13, No. 2, 1998, p. 195; for IHB’s
figure, see Joseph Morgan and Mark J. Valencia, ed., “Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asia”,
Berkeley: University of California, 1984, p. 4.
8
International Hydrographic Bureau, International Hydrographic Organization [IHO] Code 6.1, 4th
ed., 1986, online: http://www.iho.shom.fr/ (August 21, 2003).
9
Supra, Footnote 3 C. C. Joyner at p. 55.
10
Federation of American Scientists [FAS], Military Analysis Network, online:
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/spratly.htm (February 12, 2003), p. 1.

7

countries of Cambodia and Vietnam; and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
Taiwan (ROC).11
Adjacent to the South China Sea lie various seas of Indonesia and the
Philippines which are now part of their respective archipelagic waters: Natuna, the
Karimata, the Java and the Sulu Seas.12
The seabed area of the South China Sea consists of about one million
square kilometres of continental shelf of less than 200 meters isobath and about two
million square kilometres of seabed area deeper than 200 meters isobath. The
continental shelf area is mainly located in the western and southern parts (Sunda
Shelf), while the deeper part is located much more to the northeast. The deeper part
in some areas reaching more than 5,000 meters (South China Sea Basin) is dotted
by various shallow banks and coral reef islands.13
The area includes hundreds of natural formations of small islands, islets,
cays, atolls, rocks, coral reefs, shoals and sandbanks, comprising four main
archipelagos in the South China Sea, namely: the Pratas, Macclesfield Bank,
Paracels, and Spratlys. Most of these islets, rocks and reefs numbering several
hundred are not suitable for human habitation but they are important for economic,
strategic, political and legal reasons. See Appendix B for the alphabetical listing of
these island reefs, its location, description and its occupier.
The Pratas Islands lie to the east and slightly to the north of China’s Hainan
Province, approximately 140 nautical miles (260 km) from mainland China, 170
nautical miles (315 km) from Hong Kong and 240 nautical miles (440 km) from
Taiwan.14 Pratas Islands are comprised of Dongsha Island, Dongsha Reef, Nanwei
Shoal and Beiwei Shoal. The largest island (Dongshadao) in the Pratas Group has a
size of 6 km long and 2 km wide.15
The Paracels lie between latitude 16° and 17° north and longitude 111° and
113° east and about 300 nm (556 km) southeast of Hainan province and 240 nm

11

Supra, Footnote 8 Heineman World Atlas at pp. 78-81.
Hasjim Djalal, “South China Sea Island disputes”. The Raffles Bulletin of Zoology, Supplement No.
8 (The Biodiversity of the South China Sea), online: http://rmbr.nus.edu.sg/latest/RBZs8SCS/djalal.html (July 09, 2003), 2000 at p. 1.
13
Ibid.
14
Supra, Footnote 3 Marwyn S. Samuels at p. 183.
15
Ibid.
12

8

(445 km) from Da Nang, Vietnam.16 The Paracel Islands consists of more than 30
islands, islets, reefs, sandbanks and shoals which are clustered into two main
groups which lie some 70 km from one another: the Amphitrites Group, consisting of
seven islands and the Crescent group composed of five main islands.17
The Macclesfield Bank, consisting of more than 20 reefs and hidden shoals
lies 13 or 15 to 70 meters under water in the middle of the South China Sea, and is
located approximately 54 nm (100 km) east of the Paracel Islands.18 Scarborough
Shoal, located southeast of the Macclesfield Bank is the only water shoal nearby
this group of submerged reefs, atolls and shoals.
The Spratlys, the most contested group of islands, is geographically located
between 4° and 11°3’ north latitude and 109°30’ and 117°50’ east longitude,
contains some 100-230 scattered islands, islets, shoals, banks atolls, cays, and
reefs.19 This group of islands lies about 650 km east of the Vietnamese coast, about
750 km south of the Paracel Islands. It is about 1,000 km from Hainan Province to
the northernmost edge of the Spratlys. It lies 1,300 km south of Taiwan and about
100 km west of the Palawan Islands of the Philippines.20 The Spratly Islands
consists of 33 islands, cays, and rocks that are permanently above water.21 It
stretches approximately 1,000 km from north to south.22 With elevations ranging
from two to six meters, the mapped islands of the Spratly archipelago, including
shallow territorial waters, cover an area of approximately 180,000 sq km (69,500 sq
m).23 Many of these islands are partially submerged islets, rocks, and reefs that are
not suitable for habitation. The total land area of the Spratly Islands is less than 3
square miles. 24

16

Ibid., at p. 184.
Ibid., at pp. 184-185.
18
Ibid., at p. 187.
19
Inventory
of
Conflict
and
Management
Case
Studies
[ICE],
online:
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/ice/spratly.htm, 1997, p. 2
20
Supra, Footnote 15 at p. 188.
21
John Robert Victor Prescott, “The maritime political boundaries of the world”, London: Methuen
and Co. Ltd., 1985, p. 30
22
Supra, Footnote 15 at p. 188.
23
Differently described in Supra Footnote 1 as having 160,000 square kilometres, northern limit is
latitude 12° north and its eastern limit longitude 111° east.
24
Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], “Spratly Islands”. The World Factbook 2002, online:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/pg.html (February 12, 2003), 2002, p. 1.
17

9

Figure 2.2 – Map of Spratly Islands showing its features, occupants and
jurisdictional claims.25

As shown in Figure 2.2, eight states claim title to these South China Sea
islands: Singapore and Malaysia has claims over Pisang Island and Pulau Batu
Puteh, located in the waters of Malacca and Singapore Straits.26 China, Taiwan and
Vietnam contest each other’s claims to sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, a
group of fifteen islets and several reefs and shoals scattered over a 200-kilometer
area in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin.27 Taiwan also contests China’s claims to
Pratas Islands and the Macclesfield Bank. As shown in Table 2.1, six states assert
claims to the Spratlys: China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the entire archipelago,
while the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim sovereignty over portions of the
Spratlys.
25

Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke. & Noel A. Ludwig,” Sharing the Resources of the South China
Sea”, Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, c1999, Plate 1, online: Retrieved July 09, 2003 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.middlebury.edu/SouthChinaSea/macand/(July 09, 2003)
26
Johnston, D.M. and Valencia, M.J., 1991, pp. 128-134.
27
Supra, Footnote 15 at pp. 98-118.
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Table 2.I. National Occupation of the Spratly Islands, 199928
Claimant
China
Philippines
Vietnam
Malaysia
Taiwan
Brunei
TOTAL

Features
Claimed
Occupied
All
7
60
8
All
27
12
3
All
1
0
0
46 Islands garrisoned

Facilities
helicopter pads
1,300 m runway
600 m runway
600 m runway
helicopter pad
None

Number
of Troops
260
595
600
70
112
0
1,637

Table 2.I also shows the claimants to the Spratly Islands, the number of
islands claimed or occupied (46 total islands garrisoned), as well as the facilities and
number of troops as of 1999. All others have established military presence in the
Spratlys except for Brunei. Facilities in the area range from helicopter pads, runways
and number of troops total 1,637.
Countries that are mostly independent but are vastly different from one
another surround the South China Sea. Hong Kong and Macau29 only recently
reverted to Chinese rule, although they are now treated as special administrative
regions. The land sizes of the countries surrounding the sea vary markedly, the
smallest being Singapore (633 sq. km.) and the largest China (9.5 million sq. km.)
Their population sizes also vary greatly, the smallest being that of Brunei
Darussalam (about 0.3 million) and the largest China (around 1,200 million). Their
gross national product (GNP) per capita also varies, with the lowest being that of
Cambodia (US$215) and the highest that of Singapore (US$26,400). Brunei has the
lowest employment in fisheries while China and Indonesia have the highest (there
are more that two million fishermen in Indonesia). Brunei has the lowest fish catch
while the highest are those of China (17.5 million tons in 1993) and Thailand (3.4
million tons in 1993). The consumption of fish per capita among the nations around
the South China Sea also differs markedly, Indonesia having the lowest per capita
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Republic of China, Taipai: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Company, 1996, p. 26
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consumption of fish of about 17 kg per year and Hong Kong the highest, at about 50
kg per year 30
The political systems of the states surrounding the South China Sea are also
markedly variegated: from the communist/socialist countries of the northern
coastlines, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam to the noncommunist southern and eastern insular countries of Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia, Philippines. Taiwan is a special case in itself. An important geographical
fact is that the insular countries control maritime approaches to and from the
coastlines of the mainland South China Sea countries.31
Aside from these marked differences, the ten countries bordering the South
China Sea also have their similarities: they all depend upon the use of maritime
space and the sea’s living and non-living resources; foreign trade plays a very
important role in the countries’ economic development plans with the US as one of
the key trade partners of the ten countries as well as other developed economies
outside the region; and finally, all of the countries are involved to a varying degree in
disputes over the ownership of islands, maritime boundary delimitation, or conflicting
maritime jurisdiction.32 These include the Natuna Islands dispute between Indonesia
and Vietnam, and between Indonesia and China; the dispute among the three
bordering states of the Eastern Gulf of Thailand (namely, Cambodia, Vietnam, and
Thailand); the dispute between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin; the
Celebes Sea dispute and the Singapore Straits (Pulau Batu Puteh) dispute between
Singapore and Malaysia; the Paracel Islands dispute among China, Taiwan, and
Vietnam; and the Spratly Islands dispute among China, the Philippines, Vietnam,
Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan.33
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CHAPTER 3
SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERESTS
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

3.1 Special Geostrategic Importance of the South China Sea
The South China Sea is one of the world’s busiest international sea-lanes.
More than half of the world’s supertanker traffic passes through the region’s waters.
In addition, the South China Sea region contains oil and gas resources strategically
located near large energy-consuming countries.34 It is also significant and important
because of its commercial and military sea-lanes notwithstanding the fact that the
islands are too small and barren to support human settlement independently or
provide any significant land-based resources.
The islands are usually considered as shipping hazards, but they are
important for commercial and political reasons. It links the region’s northeast
seaborne trade with the rest of the world. The islands in the South China Sea hold
strategic importance because they straddle the sea lanes through which commercial
vessels must sail en route to and from South Asian ports. It furnishes living and
mineral resources to the littoral states35 and serves as a strategic military sea-lane.
Ownership claims to the islands are used to bolster claims to the surrounding sea
and its resources36 as it can serve as these islands can be used by the states as a
base point to assert claims of exclusive jurisdiction over the waters and resources of
34
35

Supra, Footnote 10 at p. 1.
Supra, Footnote 9 at p. 55.
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the South China Sea. Each of the claimants can declare exclusive economic zones
or continental shelf zones measured from the baselines drawn from points fixed by
the islands they currently occupy.
The geostrategic importance of the South China Sea to the claimant states
comes in diverse forms and broad categories. An understanding thereto would help
to reduce the prospects of hostility, which has far-reaching consequences and
security implications. Once competing states unilaterally assert territorial and
maritime competence in the South China Sea in pursuit of these geostrategic
interests, with the states articulating enforceable limits of jurisdiction, and then
proceeding to grant to multinational companies concessions or licensing projects
within the areas claimed, conditions become ripe for conflict over boundaries for
allocating development opportunities in resource zones. Patterns of national anxiety
become aggravated and regional tensions escalate to the point that a military
response becomes acceptable to some governments. The result is disastrous. Thus,
special geostrategic importance of the South China Sea should be clearly defined
and understood.37

3.2 Natural Resources

a. Significant source of fish
Fish is traditionally a valuable natural resource in the South China Sea and
the Spratly Islands. The South China Sea is rich in fishing resources. Its fisheries
are based upon large numbers of short-lived species. Unlike in the Banda Sea area
in Indonesia (which is characterised by rich grounds for tuna), the species in the
South China Sea are numerous and this makes large-scale fishing industry of one
type of species somewhat difficult. There are more than 2,500 fish species in the
Indo-Malayan region alone that it is not uncommon that in a single trawl haul, 200
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species would be caught, around 80% of which would be of no or little commercial
value.38
Fishing remains an important economic activity for the littoral states. The
bordering countries in the South China Sea, namely, China, Indonesia, Thailand, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam are among the world’s top 25 major fishing
nations in terms of fish catch.39 The waters of the South China Sea hold abundant
supplies of numerous fish species. The Spratlys area is one of the world’s richest
fishing grounds, yielding up to 7.5 tons of fish per square kilometre, according to a
study conducted by the Philippine Office of Strategic and Special Studies of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).40 The study further reveals that there are
314 fish species in the Spratlys region, of which 66 are commercially significant
stocks with at least 8% of the world’s fish catch coming from the region, since it
straddles the path of yellowfin tuna migration. China estimates fish stocks of
140,000 tons in the Spratly Islands area of which 800,000 tons are allowable fish
catch.41
The modernization and expansion of the fishing fleet has resulted in overfishing in the bordering countries near shore and off shore waters, which forced their
fleets to develop high sea fisheries in the South China Sea. After the proclamation of
the 200 nm exclusive economic zone by coastal states in the area, fisheries in the
South China Sea has become a complex issue and has created fisheries disputes
among countries such as China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand,
Indonesia and Malaysia.42

b. Significant source of energy
The competing and conflicting national claims are mostly driven by
geopolitical considerations over the development of potential hydrocarbon
resources. All claimants want to exploit hydrocarbon resources if and when it proves
to be commercially viable in the South China Sea. A geophysical survey of portions
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of the Spratlys conducted by the South China Sea (SCS) Institute of Oceanology of
China confirmed strong evidence of commercial oilfields.43 Another seismic survey
in the South China Sea area was conducted by the People’s Republic of China and
estimated that the Spratly Islands hold deposits of 25 billion cubic metres of natural
gas and 105 billion barrels of oil in the Spratlys. Another study conducted by
Russia’s Research Institute of Geology of Foreign Countries in 1995 estimated that
the equivalent of 6 billion barrels of oil might be held in the same area of which 70
percent would be natural gas.44
Table 3.1 - Oil and Gas in the South China Sea Region 45

Brunei
Cambodia
China*
Indonesia*
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
Total

Proven Oil
Reserves
(Billion Barrels)
1.35
0
1 (est.)
0.2
3.9
0.2
0
<0.01
0.3
0.6
7.5 (est.)

Proven Gas
Oil Production
Reserves
(Barrels/Day)
(Trillion cubic feet)
14.1
145,000
0
0
3.5
290,000
29.7
46,000
79.8
645,000
2.7
<1,000
0
0
2.7
<1,000
7.0
59,000
6.0
180,000
145.5
1,367,000

Gas Production
(Billion Cubic
Feet)
340
0
141
0
1,300
0
0
30
482
30
2323

*Only
the
regions
near
the
South
China
Sea
are
included
Proved reserves are as of January 1, 1998; 1997 production (except Indonesia, where data
is as of 1996) Note: There are no proved reserves for the Spratly and Paracel Islands

The seabed of the South China Sea is expected to yield extensive deposits
of hydrocarbon and fossil oil, including natural gas, especially in the shelf area on
the western side and in the shallow patches of the South China Sea Basin. The
exploitation conducted by the Philippines in the Reed Banks gives weight to such
speculations.46
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As shown in Table 3.1, the South China Sea region has proven oil reserves
estimated at about 7.5 billion barrels and oil production in the region is currently over
1.3 million barrels per day. Malaysian production accounts for about one-half of the
region’s total. Total South China Sea production has increased gradually over the
past few years, primarily as additional production from China, Malaysia and Vietnam
came online.47
It is also interesting to look at the oil and gas reserves in the South China
Sea region in comparison with the other oil producing regions. Table 3.2 below
reveals that the Persian Gulf region still produces most of the world’s oil to the tune
of about 19.2 million barrels per day, compared to that produced by the South China
Sea region, which is a mere 1.3 million barrels/day. Most optimistic estimates
suggest that potential oil resources (not proven reserves) of the Spratly Islands
could be as high as 1-2 billion barrels of oil and the total for the South China Sea
could be as high as 28 billion barrels. If recoverable, this could yield 180,000-370,00
barrels per day from the Spratlys group.48

Table 3.2 - Oil and Gas in the South China Sea, Comparison with other Regions 49
Proven Oil
Proven Gas Oil Production Gas
Reserves
Reserves
(Barrels/Day) Production
(Billion Barrels) (Trillion Cubic
(Billion
Feet)
Cubic
Feet)
Caspian Sea Region
15.4-29.0
236- 337
1,000,000
2846
Gulf of Mexico (U.S.)
2.7
29.4
1,014,000
5100
North Sea Region
16.8
156.6
6,200,000
7981
Persian Gulf
674.5
1718
19,226,000
5887
South China Sea
7.5
145.5
1,367,000
2323
West Africa/Gulf of Guinea*
21.5
126.3
3,137,000
200 (est.)
*Region
stretching
from
Côte
d'Ivoire
(Ivory
Coast)
to
Angola
Proved reserves as of January 1, 1998; 1997 production (Gulf of Mexico reserves are as of
January 1, 1997; production 1996)
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Technological advances in marine use and resource exploitation capabilities
has enhanced the marine awareness of nations and have increased expectations of
benefits from potential ocean resources. The extension of national jurisdiction over
ocean resources out to 200 nm from shore has opened the interest of the world in
the new resources gained – particularly oil and sealanes.
For instance, Vietnam is developing the three known oilfields located in the
western portion of the Spratly Islands area, namely: Bach Ho (White Tiger, with 88.4
million tons of oil reserves); Dai Hung (Big Bear with 102 million tons of oil
reserves); and Zong (Dragon, with 21 million tons).50 China also signed a contract
with the U.S.- based Crestone Energy Corporation for oil exploration in Wanantan
(Vanguard Bank), which contract area is located in the western part of the Spratly
Islands group and lies next to Vietnam’s Thanh Long oilfield. The Philippines has
been exploring for oil and gas in the Reed Bank area of the Spratly Islands group
since 1976.51 Appendix C provides some examples of disputes over drilling and
exploration in the South China Sea.
Oil exploration and active exploration may exacerbate and act as catalyst for
intraregional conflicts.52 It is to be noted that the mere act of exploration could
trigger conflict since it will be seen by one state as a direct challenge to its
sovereignty. This is specially so if the exploration will yield major finds.

The

discovery of major deposits would increase the incentive for claimants to more
zealously guard and enforce their claims and increase the forthrightness of parties
to unilaterally extract oil in the disputed territories and result in conflict.53

3.3 Strategic Passageway
The Spratly Islands and the South China Sea are strategically important.
Commercial sealanes through which products such as oil and other commercial
resources are transported straddle this region: more than 99% of the world’s
products move by sea and a vast portion transits the South China Sea; 25% of the
50
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world’s cargo shipping passes from the Middle East and Southeast Asia en route to
Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand; more than 10,000 vessels of
greater than 10,000 dwt move southward through the South China Sea annually,
with well over 8,000 proceeding in the opposite direction.54

The area likewise

contains two of the busiest ports in the world, Singapore and Hong Kong.55
More than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage pass through
these so called “chokepoints” which include the Straits of Malacca, Sunda Strait,
and the Straits of Lombok and Makasar, with the majority of ships continuing on into
the South China Sea. Figure 3.1 shows the shipping routes of very large crude
carriers (VLCCs). Tanker traffic passes through the Strait of Malacca leading into
the South China Sea and is more than three times greater than Suez Canal traffic,
and well over five times more than the Panama Canal. Virtually all shipping that
passes through Malacca and Sunda Straits must pass near the Spratly Islands.56
Shipping (by tonnage) in the South China Sea is dominated by raw materials
en route to East Asian countries. Tonnage via Malacca and the Spratly Islands is
dominated by liquid bulk such as crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), with dry
bulk (mostly coal and iron ore) in second place. Nearly two-thirds of the tonnage
passing through the Strait of Malacca, and half of the volume passing the Spratly
Islands, is crude oil from the Persian Gulf. Oil flows through the Strait of Malacca
rose to 8.2 million barrel/day in 1996, and rising Asian oil demand could result in a
doubling of these flows over the next decades.57
LNG shipments through the South China Sea constitute two-thirds of the
world’s overall LNG trade. Japan is the recipient of the bulk of these shipments; in
1996 Japan was dependent on LNG for over 11% of its total energy supplies. South
Korea (over 7% of energy consumption) and Taiwan (over 4% of energy
consumption) also import large volumes of LNG via the South China Sea.
The other major shipping lane in the region uses the Lombok and Makassar
Straits and continues into the Philippine Sea. Except for the north-south traffic from
Australia, it is not used as extensively as the Strait of Malacca and the South China
Sea since for most voyages it represents a detour of several hundred miles.
54
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Governments would naturally want to maintain open commercial sealanes to
sustain international trade because if freedom of navigation cannot be maintained,
the economic health of the countries in the Asia-Pacific will be seriously affected.

3.4 Strategic Waterway for Military Vessels
These sea-lanes are also critical to the movement of maritime powers’ military
forces, especially the U.S. from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the
Persian Gulf. The approaches to the South China Sea, especially in the MalaccaSingapore, Sunda-Karimata, Balabac, Mindoro, Bashi and Taiwan Straits are
located in the non-communist countries.58
These approaches are important for the passage of military vessels. In the past,
the Soviet Union placed great importance to the right of “transit passage” through
the Malacca and Singapore Straits as well as through the surrounding waters in the
South China Sea area, primarily because these passages were important for the
communication between western and eastern Russia through the warm waters of
the South Sea. The Russian Federation may revive this interest in the future once it
is in a position to do so.59
The United States has always been interested in the area because it offers
the shortest route from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and because it is essential
for the movement of U.S fleets either for its own global strategy or for the purpose of
having to defend its allies in the region.60
The islands scattered in the South China Sea provide potential staging areas
for surveillance, sea-lane interdiction and other naval operations that could disrupt
maritime traffic from Singapore to southern China and Taiwan.61 The state that
controls the Spratlys could also control major sea lanes of communication
throughout the South China Sea. The reduction of Russia’s naval expenditure due to
internal economic disruption in the 1990s has pushed China to assert its
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expansionist strategy in the South China Sea. This threatens the Philippines, as its
Mutual Defense Treaty Pact with the United States is no longer effective.62 The
United States also has an important national security interests in maintaining
unimpeded transit rights, on the surface, in the air, and under the sea, throughout
the South China Sea, especially to protect Japan in the event of hostilities.

Figure 3.1 - Supertanker Movements63

The region’s economic growth and security depend upon continued freedom
of navigation for both merchant and military traffic. The Spratly Islands are located
along the South China Sea shipping lanes. All claimants, including China have
taken great pains in assuring others that their claims and actions in the Spratlys will
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remain consistent with international freedom of navigation protocols such as the Law
of the Sea Convention. If any claimant threatens to inhibit the freedom of navigation
along adjacent international sea lanes of communications (SLOCs), other nations in
or near the region would become involved, including the United States.64
External events such as broader regional conflicts or escalating tensions
could also spill over into the South China Sea and thus trigger conflict in the region.
Examples of such regional tensions are the conflict between mainland China and
Taiwan, and the border tensions between Vietnam and China.65

3.5 Economics – Post-Asian Financial Crisis
According to Anthony Bergin, in the 1990s the countries of East Asia
experienced high rates of growth. This came to a halt in 1997-1999. During these
years, several Asia Pacific economies experienced in the worst economic crisis to
hit the region in decades. In 1998, Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand experienced negative economic growth with the
rate of decline diving down to 13.7% in Indonesia, 8% in Thailand, 7% in ROK and
6.4 % in Malaysia. Between 1997 and 1998, real defence expenditures declined in
Thailand (39%), Indonesia (31%), Burma (18%), Malaysia (17%), and the
Philippines (7%). Defence spending likewise declined in Japan, South Korea and
Pakistan.66
The Asian financial crisis definitely forced a reassessment of regional energy
requirements on the quest for energy resources in the South China Sea. It has to be
considered that the price of oil has more than doubled since oil is bartered in dollars
and local currencies have depreciated considerably. The value of a barrel of oil in
local currency to both consumer and potential producer continue to rise. Even with
cuts in consumption, the overall energy costs are rising.67
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The financial crisis had its biggest impact on the modernization plans of the
various claimants, which scaled back their modernizations efforts and slowed down
its military spending as well. The inability to patrol, monitor activities in disputed
areas, detect violations and enforce national claims in the disputed territories were
natural results.68 This has brought about a situation where the more capable states
have taken advantage of the situation.
On the other hand, in the years following the worst of the Asian financial crisis,
however, naval programs have managed to get back on the agenda, with countries
of East Asia finding the resources to replenish the funding for naval expansion.69
The evidence now suggests that defence programs are alive and well in East Asia
with naval programs retaining a high priority. Military spending across the region is
recovering along with most Asian economies but is still dependent on continued
economic growth and the state of the US economy. This has wide implications since
the region will now be facing increased tensions at sea. East Asia remains the
second-largest regional arms market after the Middle East and North Africa.70

3.5 Baselines for EEZ and Continental Shelf
For South China Sea littoral states, the islands currently occupied and under
dispute by the claimant states may become possible base points from which states
may extend their claims to exclusive jurisdictional territory under principles of
customary and conventional international maritime law.
The national effort to stake out the South China Sea territory stem largely from
jurisdictional rights for coastal states over offshore seabed resources as set out in
the 1982 LOS Convention. Articles 46 to 54 and 121 of this instrument codify new
rights that accrue to a state having territorial sovereignty over an island or group of
islands. Paramount among these is the exclusive right to exploit living and non-living
resources of the water column and seabed surrounding an island or archipelago.
The state holding valid legal title to sovereignty over an island is permitted to
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establish a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
around that island under Article 121.
If it obtains recognized sovereign independence as an archipelagic state, it has
the right to draw a straight baseline between the outermost islands and to acquire
exclusive rights to explore and exploit living and non-living resources within the area
enclosed by that baseline, subject to baseline length restrictions set out in Article 47.
Otherwise, or as a non-archipelagic state, the legal rights to explore resource
offshore will flow from the rights to exploit the continental shelves of offshore group
of islands under Article 77 and 81 of the 1982 LOSC.
If the claimants will declare an EEZ or continental shelf delimitations
seaward from points fixed by islands in accordance with Article 121, over which they
now assert sovereignty, nearly the entire ocean and seabed in the SCS would be
subjected to various degrees of national jurisdiction. An ocean region comprised of
high seas and international seabed would be rendered a semi-enclosed sea,71
defined under Article 122 of the LOS Convention.
This situation has already occurred in large part in the region when littoral
states have made overlapping sovereignty claims to South China Sea islands, which
leads to a de facto military partition of the Spratlys archipelago.
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CHAPTER 4
TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
“The disputes are not primarily about oil but rather about the strategic significance
of the islands and the sovereignty claims thereto…it should be remembered that the
claimants are countries, not oil companies. Countries must and do think long-term
and multi-dimensional, particularly when territory is involved. Thus, it is doubtful that
the claimants would dampen their disputes simply because the oil potential may be
modest.”
- Mark J. Valencia

4.1 Justification for Claims
In this Chapter, an examination of the basis for the conflicting claims to territorial
sovereignty asserted by the claimant states will be made. The tenability of the legal
arguments propounded by them will be analyzed subsequently in the next Chapter.
It will be observed that much focus had been placed by the states in legalistic
arguments to support their assertions of sovereignty over the island territories. The
reason may be that decision-makers in the region believed that the determination of
sovereignty over the contested island groups and the delimitation of jurisdiction over
maritime space, two totally distinct principles are intrinsically linked. This is reflected
in the joint statement at the end of the Bandung Conference, which states that “any
territorial and jurisdictional dispute in the South China Sea area should be resolved
by peaceful means through dialogue and negotiation.”72 Under this mindset
grounded primarily on prevailing norms for the delimitation of maritime boundaries,
the establishment of title to islands is a precondition for their use as base points
72
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from which littoral states may determine the extent of their respective maritime
competences. It had become a policy for the states competing for the islands to
insist that the question of who has valid title to the disputed islands should be first
resolved before the issue of maritime delimitation can even be addressed. It will be
proven later that resolution through the use of evidentiary contest where each of the
claimant states try to comply with legal standards for proving territorial sovereignty
will not only be futile as it did not lead to the definitive resolution of the territorial
aspect of the Spratlys dispute but had just perpetuated the dispute as a constant
source of friction among the claimants.
The islands claimed and occupied by the states are summarized in Appendix D
to guide in the consideration of the following assertions of the claimant states:

4.1.1 China
China had propounded claims on sovereignty based on historic title
maintaining that their agents were the first to discover, develop and administer the
archipelago as part of their territories.73
In a declaration issued by its Foreign Minister Zhou En-Lai on 15 August
1951, China made its first modern public statement claiming the islands in the South
China Sea three weeks before the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty with
Japan.74 Zhou En-Lai said that the “Central People’s Government of the People’s
Republic of China declares the inviolable sovereignty of the People’s Republic of
China over Spratly Islands and the Paracel Archipelago which will by no means be
impaired by any British-American draft for a peace treaty and its stipulations”. The
statement of Zhou En-Lai was elaborated in an article in People’s China which cited
as evidence of Chinese claims to the South China Sea, references in documents
such as the “Wujing Zongyao” dating back to the 11th century Sung dynasty, the
discovery on the islands of coins and other artefacts from the 14th century Ming
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dynasty and the records of naval patrols of the area conducted by Chinese
navigators during the Qing dynasty.75
In a latter Foreign Ministry document entitled: “China’s Indisputable
Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nasha islands”, issued on 30 January 1980, China
sought to anchor its claims on more ancient evidence by presenting excerpts from
two books, entitled: “Nanzhou Yiwuzhi” and “Funanzhuan” from the 3rd century three
kingdom period to prove that the Chinese were the first to discover the Spratlys and
the Paracels and to exploit its resources.76 Historical events include naval
expeditions to the Spratly Islands by the Han Dynasty in 110 AD and the Ming
Dynasty from 1403-1433 AD. They also claim that Chinese fishermen and
merchants have worked and traded in the region for centuries. China is using
archaeological evidence to bolster its claims of sovereignty. In 1947, China
produced a map with nine (9) undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the islands
within those lines.77 In 1976, China also enforced its claim upon the Paracel Islands
(which it refers to as Xisha Islands) by seizing them from Vietnam and included
Xisha as part of its Hainan Island province.78
China has been the most belligerent among the claimant states in pursuing
their claim and has occupied some islands in the process. A classic example of
China’s aggressive posture was the dispute between China and Vietnam in 1988.
Chinese naval vessels sailed into the Spratlys in January 1988 and Chinese
marines started building defences on one of the largest islands, the first time China
has settled soldiers on the islands. In March, fighting broke out between Vietnam
and China and China sunk two Vietnamese ships. While they have moved to more
political means of dealing with the dispute, tensions remain high in the area.
Confrontation surfaced again when China contracted with a US firm to begin testing
for oil deposits, even though the territorial issue remains unresolved. Occasional
harassment of fishermen from both sides continues as well.
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In 1992, China passed a special territorial sea and contiguous zone act

79

to

legalize its claims to the Spratlys.80 Article 2 of this legislation specifically identifies
both the Paracels and Spratly archipelagos as Chinese territory. To uphold this
claim to title, China has since 1988 deployed some 260 marines on seven of the
Spratly islands.81
China resumed its expansionist policies in February 1995 when troops from
the PRC occupied Mischief Reef, a shoal in the Spratlys located inside the 200-mile
EEZ claimed by the Philippines. They constructed three fisherman’s structures on
the half-submerged atoll. Construction was resumed on Mischief Reef in October
1998 as three octagonal structures were expanded and solidified, which act was an
open breach of the 1995 Code of Conduct signed by China with the Philippines.82

4.1.2 Taiwan
Reference to “Chinese” claims to historic title should be deemed to
encompass those of both the People’s Republic as well as Taiwan, Republic of
China. The scope of the historic claims to be the successor to all rights pertaining to
the Chinese state prior to its de facto division in 1949. It is to be noted that China
has not protested the Taiwanese occupation of Itu Aba in the Spratlys largely
because up until 1998, the Taiwanese garrison on the island was the only “Chinese”
presence in the archipelago.83 If in the future, Taiwan should declare its legal
separation from China, it appears that Taiwan would likewise have to renounce its
claims to the Spratlys as one based on historic title and would, as a new state have
to rely on other bases for the acquisition of such title. Since Taiwan was the first
79
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state to garrison Itu Aba after the Second World War, its strongest claim to title over
the Spratlys would be based on occupation of the largest islands in the archipelago.
Taiwan claims it was the first government to establish a physical presence
on one of Spratlys islands following the Japanese departure after World War II.
Taiwan announced its claim to the atoll in 1947 and has occupied and maintained a
garrison on the largest island of the Spratlys, Itu Aba constantly since 1956. From
this time until the late 1980s, Taiwan maintained a force of some 500 soldiers on Itu
Aba, although by 1999 the number of troops had been reduced to about 110.84
Taiwan’s claims are similar to those of China, and are based upon the same
principle of its longstanding ties to the islands. As with China, Taiwan’s claims are
also not clearly defined but evidence suggests that both governments made efforts
to coordinate positions on Chinese claims in international discussions of the Spratly
issues in Indonesia.85
Its claims to the island are based on its assertion that Taiwan and its
Kuomintang government are the true China. Both Taiwan and the People’s Republic
of China say that the islands were discovered by Chinese navigators, used by
Chinese fishermen for centuries, and under the administration of China since the
15th century. Further, the Kuomintang sent a naval expedition to the islands and took
formal possession in 1946. It left a garrison on the largest island of Itu Aba.
However, since Taiwan claims to be the true China, it believes the islands belong to
it and not to the PRC. Its main concern is that China alone or China or Vietnam will
gain control and thus, have a monopoly on the South China Sea.86

4.1.3 Vietnam
Vietnam had also propounded claims on sovereignty based on historic title. It
followed the Chinese example of using archaeological evidence to bolster
sovereignty claims. Vietnam announced and expanded on its historic claims to the
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Paracels and the Spratlys in two “White Papers” issued in 1979 and 1982,
respectively, by the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, entitled:
“Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos”. Both
documents cited five evidentiary items to establish Vietnam’s historic claims, all of
which pertain to activities sponsored by the Nguyen dynasty, first as a local
potentate who ruled the area of Southern Vietnam, later called Cochinchina during
the 17th century and subsequently as emperors of the Kingdom of Annam, formed
by the unification of Cochinchina and Tonkin in the north, during the 19th century.87
The oldest item is a map of the Quang Ngoi region of southern Vietnam, which
identifies a sandbank called “Bat Cai Vang” on the “Eastern Sea”, where salvage
operations were undertaken on behalf of the Nguyen princes. The map is contained
in the “Hung Duc” Atlas, a collection of maps of the Vietnam region, purportedly
prepared between 1460 and 1467, but compiled only in the 17th century.88 Other
items in the “White Papers” cited as evidence of Vietnam’s connection to the islands
in the South China Sea recorded the development of Annamite interest in the
lucrative salvage business conducted on the islands for the purpose of evaluating
their resource. Vietnam claims the entire Spratly Islands as an offshore district of the
province of Khanh Hoa and the islands they call Truong Sa islands, which they
claim, are part of the empire of Annam, Vietnam’s ancestors in the 19th century.89 In
1815, an expedition sent by king Gia Lon to chart sea lanes occupied and settled in
the islands. The French, who were Vietnam’s colonial rulers, annexed the Spratlys
in 1933, so Vietnam says the islands are theirs as the inheritors of the French
possessions by right of cession from this French claim. In September 1973, Vietnam
declared that the Spratlys were part of the Phuos Tuy province.90
Vietnam has occupied thirteen of the Spratly Islands in 1975 and in
September 1989 occupied three more islets and has since taken at least nine atolls.
In 1999, Vietnam had stationed 600 troops on at least twenty-seven Spratly land
formations. In addition to the Spratlys, Vietnam claims the Paracel Islands, although
the Chinese seized them in 1974.91 Vietnamese claims cover an extensive area of
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the South China Sea, although they are not clearly defined and failed also to identify
and distinguish between the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos.
Along with China, Vietnam is considered as one of the main protagonists in
the dispute.

4.1.4 Philippines
The Philippines had also attempted to structure its claim to the Spratlys as
one based on historic title. The earliest manifestation of the Philippines’ interest in
the Spratlys was recorded in 1947 when the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Carlos P. Garcia advocated that the New Southern Archipelago, the entity
established by Japan to administer both the Spratly and the Paracel archipelago in
1939 and throughout the war, be turned over to the Philippines as a security
guarantee. The demand was based on the fact that Itu Aba was used as a base for
the Japanese invasion of the Philippines during the war. Several months after this
declaration, the Philippines accepted a proposal among the eleven members of the
Far Eastern Commission to draft a peace treaty with Japan.92
While these equivocal actions would hardly provide the basis for a Philippine
claim to historic title at par with those of either China or Vietnam, the Philippines had
incorporated a claim of historic title to the Spratlys in the drafting of its domestic law.
The Philippine Constitution of 1973 and 1987 both contain definitions of “Philippine
territory” that includes references to “territory over which the Philippines has historic
title”.93 The 1973 provision originally referred to the still unresolved claim to Sabah,
which the Philippines had maintained against Malaysia since the latter’s
independence in 1957. However, with the purported discovery in 1956 of the
Kalayaan Islands by Tomas Cloma in the area of the Spratly archipelago, the
Philippines has expanded the interpretation of this clause to encompass its claim to
the Spratlys. Accordingly, Presidential Decree No. 1596, issued in 1978 justifies the
annexation of the Kalayaan Islands as part of the Philippines on “historic grounds”,
among others.94
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Tomas Cloma is a Filipino businessman who owned fishing fleet and
operated a private maritime training institute.

In 1956, Cloma proclaimed the

creation of a new island state “Kalayaan” (Freedomland). Cloma continued to assert
his claim until 1974 when ownership was officially transferred under a “Deed of
Assignment and Waiver of Rights” to the Philippine government. In 1971, the
Philippines officially claimed eight (8) islands that it refers to as the Kalayaan Group
of Islands, partly on the basis of this exploration, arguing that the islands is terra
nullius and had not belonged to anybody and were open to claim by any state.95 The
claim made in 1971 was mainly in response to a Philippine fishing vessel being fired
upon by Taiwanese forces stationed on Itu Aba Island. The Philippine government
reacted by protesting the incident and asserting legal title by annexing islands in the
Spratly group based on Cloma’s claim. In 1978, the Marcos government formally
annexed the archipelago to the Philippines and placed it under the administration of
the province of Palawan.96
Another basis for its claim to sovereignty over the islands is the proximity
principle. The official position of the Philippines is that the Kalayaan Islands group
are separate and distinct from the Spratlys and Paracels and that the continental
shelf of the Kalayaan Islands group is juxtaposed to the Palawan province and
extends some 300 miles westward into the Philippines’ EEZ.97 President Ferdinand
E. Marcos reinforced the 1978 claim. He made formal claims by declaring that fiftyseven (57) of the islands were part of Palawan Province by virtue of their presence
on the continental margin of the archipelago. The Kalayaan Islands lie in a shallow
section of the South China Sea west of the Philippine archipelago. Kalayaan is a
rich fishing area that had been identified as a potential source of petroleum deposits.
To beef up its defense Philippines troops were sent to the Kalayaans in
1968. Manila regularly tried to extract from the United States a declaration that it
would defend the Philippines’ claim to the Kalayaan Islands as part of the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America, but the United States refused to give the treaty that interpretation. The
Philippine military, which first occupied three of the islands in 1968, continued to
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garrison marines on several islands.98 In 1976, it set up a garrison on Palawan and
in 1978 it established more soldiers on seven of the islands. In 1979, the Philippines
stated that it wanted control of the seven islands under its control and administration
and not the rest of the archipelago.99 To defend its claim, the Philippines currently
have 595 marines stationed on eight islands. These bases are fortified with heavy
artillery and are equipped with radar facilities, a weather station and ammunition
depots.

4.1.5 Malaysia
Malaysia’s claims are based upon the continental shelf principle in Articles
76 and 77 of the 1982 LOS Convention basing its claims to certain islands on ocean
law principles associated with prolongation of a continental shelf seaward. Malaysia
claims that a state possessing a continental shelf also possesses sovereign rights
over land formations arising seaward from that shelf.100
Malaysia claims sovereignty over twelve islands in the Spratly group within
an area of clearly defined coordinates. Malaysia has occupied three of the twelve
islands but claims the whole chain, which it considers to be part of its continental
shelf.101 Malaysia has tried to build up one atoll by bringing soil from the mainland
and has even built a hotel.102
Malaysia has been involved in the dispute since 1979 and is the most recent
claimant to occupy part of the Spratlys with military troops. In late 1977, Malaysian
troops landed on Swallow Reef. Since then, it has stationed about seventy soldiers
on three of the twelve islets under its claim.103
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4.1.6 Brunei
Brunei has only one claim to the Spratly Group, which is the Louisa Reef, a
naturally submerged formation or a submarine feature and part of the seabed.104
Similar to the Malaysian justification, the legal premise for substantiating Brunei’s
claim flows from the continental shelf principle under the 1982 LOS Convention
stating that the southern part of the Spratly chain is actually a part of its continental
shelf and therefore part of its territory and resources.105
Louisa Reef is also claimed by Malaysia, taking possession of the atoll in
1984.

4.1.7 Indonesia
Indonesia is not a claimant to any of the Spratly Islands but Chinese and
Taiwanese claims in the South China Sea extend into Indonesia’s EEZ and
continental shelf, which includes Indonesia’s Natuna gas field.106
It is worth mentioning that Indonesia tried to start negotiating through a
number of conferences among the disputants. Jakarta believed that as a
disinterested littoral state, it could be an impartial mediator. These conferences will
be discussed later in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS
5.1 Background of the South China Sea Claims
After an instructive discussion of the arguments propounded by the claimant
states to buttress their claims to sovereignty, an analysis will be made in this
Chapter on the tenability of such justifications. It will be seen that insistence on
determining which of the disputing states has the best claim to title over the islands
on the basis of norms of general international law for the purpose of adjudicating
claims to territorial sovereignty will only prompt the use of military means by the
states to improve their positions in the area.107 It will subsequently be proposed that
instead of making such justifications to their claims, the states should shift the focus
of their priorities to the utilization of the maritime resources itself and to determine a
useful framework that will enable the concerned entities to generate a new and
effective arrangement that shall address the concerns peculiar to their situation as
members of a geographic region with shared political and economic interests in the
utilization of a common resource.108
The maritime boundary delimitation in the South China Sea is best described
as problematic. First, there is no universally accepted sea-chart showing precisely
the islands, atolls, shoals and cays and its boundaries and features. Neither are the
different systems for naming the islands by Chinese, Filipino, Vietnamese, French
and English names of any help as they are superimposed on each other without any
clear relation.109 This adds to the confusion as to how to properly refer to the islands
and as to the definite number of the islands. It is likewise not helpful that each
107
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country presents its case in a biased account and often omits relevant sources,
statements or incidents of contesting claimants in order to justify its claim.
Verification of the claims is likewise difficult because access to these records is
restricted and confidential for reasons of national security. As a starting point, it is
suggested the name of South China Sea should be converted to South East Asian
Sea (SEA Sea),110 as the name of South “China” Sea connotes that it is a “Chinese”
lake so that there would be denying their historical influence to the detriment of other
claimant states.
Second, the overlapping claims to sovereignty are laid over an assortment of
various semi-submerged natural formation scattered throughout the region. Are
these territories land, which are capable of appropriation? If so, are they the kind of
territories, which entail the attribution of extensive maritime zones to the state which
has sovereignty over them?
These questions are relevant and should be established and clarified at the
outset. For all we know, we can be talking here of territories not capable of
appropriation. It is also well to thresh this out since archipelagos are naturally
composed of a sprinkling of banks, islets and rocks, and a few islands. An island
territory to be capable of appropriation must have a piece of land apparently present
at high tide which is large enough to be habitable. Article 121 of the 1982 LOS
Convention states that it should be a “naturally formed area of land”, a geological
criterion. This will exclude artificial islands. That it should protrude above the high
water line is a hydrographic criterion.111
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the land subject of the dispute
are capable of appropriation as the main islands are clearly identified on nautical
charts and the fringes (islets, sandbanks, coral reefs and rocks) can be seen as
accessories to the main islands.112
As for the generation of maritime zones by the State which has sovereignty
over them, paragraph 2 and 3, of Article 121 of the 1982 LOS Convention states:

109

Supra, Footnote 1 at p. 15.
Maximo Q. Mejia, In an interview conducted last 21 August 2003, at the World Maritime
University, Malmö, Sweden
111
Ibid.
112
Ibid.
110

36

Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island
are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention
applicable to other land territory.
Rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
The question is whether these territories come within the purview of par. 3,
Article 121. It is submitted that they do and they might as well have a territorial sea
but they do not provide entitlement to an exclusive economic zone. Some states try
to meet the requirements of par. 3 by stationing troops, incorporating occupied
islands within larger political subdivisions – even holding elections. However, they
are in reality still no more than military garrisons with no economic life of its own
and, within the exception of Itu Aba which has an airstrip, survives solely on supply
airdrops and the occasional replenishment by naval vessels. A question might also
be added whether these islands are indeed terra nullius or whether it involves a
territorial dispute between two states which both claim title to sovereignty. This is in
fact a dispute between several states which occupy or have occupied the same
lands over different periods of time and on the basis of different titles so it cannot be
considered terra nullius.
The third reason is that the competing claims in the South China Sea are
bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral claims. The most serious of these disputes are
those over the Paracels because they involve non-Southeast Asian states and in the
case of the Spratlys because it involve many parties.
A fourth problem is that the complicated competing claims may give rise to
armed conflict. Taiwan remains in control of the biggest island, Itu Aba; the PRC has
occupied seven reefs and rocks since January 1988; Vietnam now occupies at least
twenty-seven islands, reefs and cays; the Philippines controls at least eight principal
islands and claims some fifty other islets, reefs and shoals; Malaysia has troops on
three atolls and asserts claims to nine other geological formations in the area; and,
Brunei claims Louisa Reef.113 The maritime-resource dimension drives these
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conflicting claims - geopolitical considerations over the development of potential
hydrocarbon resources which gives rise to another problem discussed earlier in
Chapter 3.
The legal foundation of the claims of the various states have been discussed
in Chapter 4 where it was mentioned that the claims to sovereignty by different
states over territory in the South China Sea are based on principles of acts of
sovereignty, discovery, historic title, occupation, continental shelf principle as well as
other associated principles under the Law of the Sea Convention. This Chapter will
be an analysis of the bases or justification for the claims of the states to examine
whether they can stand scrutiny under international law and the relevant
Conventions.
An attempt will likewise be made in explaining why the legal arguments
propounded by these claimants have not resulted in a definite resolution of the
territorial sovereignty issue.

Instead, it has even added friction among the

disputants making such efforts at resolution futile.

5.2 Analysis of the Claims
5.2.1 China
China and Vietnam propounded claims of sovereignty based on historic title
asserting that their agents were the first to discover, develop and administer the
archipelago.
Generally recognized due to its density and vintage, the historic record relied
upon by China provides the most plausible support for primacy in the discovery of
the South China Sea archipelagos. This however will not support China’s claims as
it is beset with evidentiary problems.114 They are at best proof of general knowledge
of the area but are not useful to bolster their legal argument that they were the first
to discover, exploit, develop and administer the archipelagos.
Documents will show that Chinese fishermen have visited the islands since
time immemorial but they were private, non-proprietary acts which did not
114

Supra, Footnote 3 at p. 18.

38

correspond to taking of possession, nor an intention to assert sovereignty.
Occupation by individuals who are pursuing their own interest and are not acting in
the name of the government does not constitute possession.115
First, China must accurately identify the islands it claims to have discovered
and exploited. While they cite as reference Chou Ch’u-fei’s Ling-Wai-tai-ta
(Information on what lies beyond the passes), there are notable problems of
authenticity and accuracy specially in describing points named as “Ch’ien-li
changsa” and the “Wan-li shih T’ang” in the Southern Seas around the area of the
Paracels and is very far the Spratly Islands which is further asea. Names,
supposedly used to denominate Spratly Islands are inadequate to refer to a number
of islands and would not correspond to the maritime space it is claimed to designate.
This shows the unfamiliarity of the scholars and navigators with the dimensions of
the Spratly archipelago as most of the historic records point to coastal points and
not oceanic routes.116
This problem is compounded by the fundamental question of whether proof
of historical title carries sufficient legal weight to validate acquisition of territory. In
international law, mere discovery of a territory is insufficient to vest in the discoverer
valid title of ownership to territory.117

In a long line of cases, it was held that

discovery of new territory does not of itself vest in the discoverer unchallengeable
title of ownership, but merely vests inchoate title, which must be perfected by
subsequent continuous and effective acts of occupation or permanent settlement.118
Since actual occupation is now the basis for ascertaining sovereignty over
disputed territory, independent of historic claims, the line of decisions since the
Palmas Islands case defined the parameters of what shall be deemed the required
level of occupation. Essentially, it is required that the display of actual occupation be
continuous and peaceful in relation to other states, exclusive and effective in order
to guarantee the minimum protection to the rights accorded other states and their
nationals by international law in the disputed territory.119
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Evidence of permanent settlement is not persuasive in China’s claim to the
Spratlys. At most, it will perhaps confer on them traditional fishing rights.

5.2.2 Taiwan
Since the justifications for the claim of Taiwan merely mirror China’s claim, it
suffers the same deficiencies as those of China. Discovery of and intermittent
contact with scattered island formations are insufficient cause to establish legal title
to sovereignty.120
However, its claim to and its unchallenged exercise of control to Itu Aba for
more than four decades may qualify as a display of continuous and peaceful
sovereignty, which is a condition necessary for supporting a legal claim to the island.

5.2.3 Vietnam
Vietnam’s claims to the South China Sea flows from its historic activities but
is diluted by the failure to specifically identify and distinguish between the Spratly
Islands and Paracel archipelagos when its geographic dimensions clearly show that
they are distinct from each other. Vietnam treat the two island groups jointly and
assert that the recorded references to salvaging and fishing activities in and around
the Paracels likewise refer to the Spratlys because the name of Paracels also
encompass the Spratlys. The “White Papers” lump the Paracels and the Spratlys
with general common names like “Hoang Sa”, “Dai Truong Sa” and “Van Ly Truong
Sa”, with “Hoang Sa” as the most frequently used. This resembles a feeble attempt
to obscure a historic record.121
This has compounded the difficulty of assessing the lawfulness and propriety
of the claims. As to the historical record, there is also doubt as to its authenticity and
accuracy. In international law, mere historical claims without evident occupation and
permanent settlement is susceptible to legal challenge when involving claim to title
over territory in the oceans. This also makes it possible for claimants to continually
compile evidence of their long-standing claim; the ease and facility over which it can
be done through newly discovered “vintage” evidence could be astounding.
120
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As to its claim by right of cession from a French claim to the islands first
made in 1933, it should be noted that the French did not made any subsequent
effort to perfect title to the Spratlys by occupation, neither did they act by returning to
the islands after Japan departed following the World War II, and when Japan
relinquished all title and future claims to the islands at the San Francisco
Conference on 1951. Therefore, France possessed no lawful title to the Spratly
group to which Vietnam could succeed.122
As to its reliance on the proximity principle to assert its claim, this argument
has not been recognized in international law to rule in favour of the state whose
territory lie closest to the disputed lands. This has been the ruling in the Island of
Palmas case. Hence, the fact that where Paracels are concerned, the closest point
from these islands to Vietnam lies some 170 nm from Da Nang and 156 nm from the
coast of Hainan, or that the distance separating the Spratlys from the coast of
Vietnam is 250 nm, while the archipelago lies some 522 nm from Hainan, have no
bearing or legal substance.

5.2.4 Philippines
The Philippine claim clearly defines the coordinates and is readily
identifiable. However, the coordinates are not measured from base points on land,
but from fixed position at sea which seem to have been chosen rather arbitrarily. It is
therefore also not so clear whether the Philippine claim is limited to islands or rocks
within those lines, or whether it also includes the whole sea within those lines.123
As to the propinquity argument as basis of the Philippine position in 1947,
the security factor was added in mixture to this claim. On this basis, the Philippines
laid claim to sovereignty over the New Sovereign Archipelago. Geological linkages
of the Kalayaan claim to the Palawan Islands, as seen in maritime maps as well as
hydrographic surveys also present a more solid basis.
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5.2.5 Malaysia
Malaysia claims certain islands in the Spratlys group (Layang Layang,
Swallow Reef and Louisa Reef) based on ocean law principles associated with the
seaward prolongation of a continental shelf. They claim that a state possessing a
continental shelf also possesses sovereign rights over land formations arising from
that shelf. That inference is misguided and flawed under contemporary international
law as the 1982 LOS Convention neither stipulates nor invites such an
interpretation.124 Article 121 of the Convention does set out a regime for an island,
which is defined as a “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide.” The Convention also gives to a state with established
sovereignty over an island the right to exploit living and non-living resources in the
water column and on the seabed within that island’s territorial sea, contiguous zone,
and exclusive economic zone. The critical legal consideration for acquisition of
sovereign title over an island formation is not the geological affinity of a coastal state
to island formation arising from continental shelves offshore. Rather, ownership is
derived from occupation, demonstrated by a continuous and effective display of
sovereignty through permanent settlement.125 In other words, the continental shelf
principle is not a basis for claiming title to islands, but may be a basis for a claim to
the resources to the shelf. When the 1982 LOS Convention state that a state can
measure its exclusive economic zone from baselines drawn over islands, the
assumption is that the state can show that these islands belong to it particularly if
such islands are contested. The state cannot work backwards and say that it has an
EEZ and therefore, certain islands belong to it.126
Generally, establishment of military outposts may be considered vestiges of
occupation. But such military presence must meet the test of “effective occupation”
through permanent settlement, which will depend on the longevity of the presence,
and whether settlers can be “permanently” attracted to inhabit the region. Such
occupation has yet to be effected by Malaysia. Also, while Malaysia may use the
continental shelf provisions in the 1982 LOS Convention to support its claims to
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seabed resources, these provisions do not legally uphold assertions to sovereignty
over land formations that are permanently above sea level.

5.2.6 Brunei
Like Malaysia, Brunei’s claim flows from the continental shelf provision in the
1982 LOS Convention. While Malaysia claims island formation, Brunei, on the other
hand, claims Louisa Reef, which is a submarine feature and is part of the seabed.
Brunei has the burden to prove that Louisa Reef is part of the extension of its
continental shelf. Brunei doesn’t even have to prove settlement because the rest is a
submarine formation and the key criterion is to be able to prove that the continental
shelf is a natural prolongation seaward from the coastal territory of Brunei. If this
should be proven, Brunei would enjoy the exclusive right to exploit resources of the
reef.127

5.3

Legal Aspects - Applicable Provisions of the UNCLOS for Proper
Delimitation of the Claims/International Laws Related to the
Dispute
To summarise, the justification for the territorial claims by different states in

the South China Sea are quite thin. The authenticity of the documentary background
is of questionable authenticity and the historical records are contradictory. None of
the claimants seem to offer an unassailable historic or legal claim. The advent of
the 1982 LOS Convention made it important for states to strengthen the legal facets
of their claims as the 1982 LOS Convention became the standard for the
demarcation of offshore jurisdictional limits for resource exploitation.
The International Court of Justice has used “effective occupation”
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discovery as primary considerations in evaluating territorial claims, although a
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certain geographical feature’s location, its history, and whether other claimants have
a record of protesting illegal occupation may be considered in determining the
legitimacy of sovereignty claims.129
Legal substance needs to be weighed up in relation to a process of
acquisition of title and maintenance of title which consists of a lot more than mere
geographical data. By disconnecting occupation as a means to acquire title from
historic claims, the Palmas rule has opened the field of competition for disputed
territory to states whose interests therein may have been fuelled by expansionist
goals. This will induce or have in fact already induced competing states to act
unilaterally in order to compile as dense a record of activity so as to outweigh that of
all the other claimants, thus potentially resulting in the escalation of competitive
tension among the interested states.130
Also, the fact that an island is situated within the exclusive economic zone of a
claimant state has no bearing on whether an island belongs to one state or another
as it is the title of sovereignty to an islands which when determined leads to the
attribution to this island of a territorial sea or an EEZ, as the case may be.
Separate from the issue of who owns the islands and rocks and whether the
submerged reefs of the Spratly Islands can themselves generate maritime zones is
the question of whether the islands can sustain human habitation or economic life,
the minimum criterion for an island to generate its own continental shelf or EEZ.
Even if human life can be sustained, islands carry less weight than continental
borders in generating EEZs under the prevailing interpretations of the Law of the
Sea. Artificial islands on which structures have been built are entitled to a 500-meter
safety zone, but they cannot generate a territorial sea, much less a continental shelf
or EEZ. Features that appear only at low tide can generate a partial twelve-mile
territorial sea only if they are within twelve nautical miles of any feature that

The Clipperton Arbitration adds that if a state makes its appearance in uninhabited land and
the occupation is undisputed, effective occupation has been established as well. Although France
could not claim an incomplete title from initial discovery, it follows from the Island of Palmas
arbitration that a title derived from effective occupation prevails over initial discovery. This is
also in line with the British 'Hinterland-doctrine' which stipulates that if a nation has made a
settlement it has a title of sovereignty to
all vacant adjacent land.
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generates a territorial sea. Features submerged at low tide are not subject to
sovereignty and generate no maritime zones at all.
The acceptance by the disputing parties of the prevailing interpretation of
these provisions to islands in the South China Sea has the potential to greatly
reduce the area of overlapping claims, since some disputants have based their
claims on an interpretation that the features themselves can generate an EEZ of up
to 200 nautical miles. A strict interpretation of the 1982 LOS Convention provision
regarding a feature’s ability to sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
may well leave few if any of the features in the Spratly Islands able to generate an
EEZ, greatly reducing the potential area of overlapping claims. Even if these islands
were capable of generating an EEZ, it is unlikely that they would be considered able
to generate one of 200 nautical miles. After sovereignty of the islands is decided, the
question of how the EEZs might be defined is critical to determining the size and
scope of the areas where negotiations might be necessary to resolve territorial
disputes.131
The 1982 LOS Convention stipulates that in areas where EEZs overlap, the
dispute should be settled through peaceful negotiation among the parties
concerned, or the parties might voluntarily agree to third-party mediation or to
judicial consideration by the ICJ. There is a slowly evolving body of international
legal precedents for evaluating the validity of various claims based on the LOS
Convention, and many disputants have found creative ways to avoid sensitive
sovereignty issues through limited bilateral joint resource development schemes.132
More of these approaches to resolving the dispute will be discussed in the next
Chapter.

5.4 Question of Sovereignty As Obstacle to Dispute Resolution
As this subtitle suggests, sovereignty has been seen as an obstacle to the
successful resolution of the dispute in the South China Sea.133 Insistence on which
of the disputing States has the best claim to title over islands will only deepen the
conflict in the region which will prompt claimants to use military means to improve
131
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their position in the area in terms of controlling over navigation and trade routes in
the South China Sea.
This unfortunately has been the mindset of the parties who treat the
establishment of title to the islands as a precondition to the delimitation of maritime
boundaries. Thus, there is an insistence to answer or resolve the question of who
has valid title or better claim to the disputed islands. It was observed that regional
efforts to resolve sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea have not been
successful. In fact, it was observed that studies that explore the question of
sovereignty over the islands are unable to propose more than general parameters
for handling issues concerning maritime jurisdiction delimitation. This legal concept
has not helped to find a definite resolution of the territorial aspect of this dispute.
This can be attributed, in part, to China’s constant opposition to multilateral
talks. China is of the position that its sovereignty over the islands is non-negotiable
although it said that joint ventures for exploring natural resources in the area could
be negotiated on a bilateral basis. China’s opposition to multilateral negotiations can
also be explained by its negotiation strategy driven by strategic bargaining
preferences. China sees it easier to isolate the disputants and deal with them oneon-one, thus, their preference to hold bilateral talks.134 See for example Appendix E,
which is the “Joint Statement between China and the Philippines on the Framework
of Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century”.
This position of China gives it the freedom to negotiate individually with
governments in the region and erodes the ability of ASEAN to organize around the
issue. For example, in the Mischief Reef incident,135 ASEAN did put pressure on
China and advocated the adoption of “codes of conduct”. In the end, China was able
to negotiate bilaterally with the Philippines to secure its objectives and paid only lip
service to the “rules of conduct”.
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From the Chinese point of view, the non-negotiation strategy can be
appreciated, since they have an abundance of historic records and artifacts to
support Chinese claims to the Spratlys. The status quo is to the Chinese interest
since it allows their historical claims to persist without fear of having to give up part
or all of what the government perceives as historically and rightfully theirs.
A further reason for not negotiating on the Spratlys is that they fear that once a
multilateral conference is held in the future and each government were allocated
one vote at the negotiating table, China will be outvoted on important issues if other
claimants have a coalition.136
From the above discussion it can be seen that political sovereignty are very
sensitive concerns especially for China. Any challenge to their claim is considered
as a challenge to their domestic sovereignty. If, on the contrary, they concede, they
see it as having adverse implications both for domestic politics and foreign relations
as the notions of “nationalism” and “sovereignty” are what will ensure the survival of
the Chinese Communist Party together in the post-Cold War era. If in the past the
Chinese government had been able to invoke foreign intervention or the Soviet
threat to bolster its legitimacy, these concepts are now seen as passé. China can
now only rely on appeals to nationalism to combat challenges to its claims in the
South China Sea, which by themselves hold little effect.

By necessity, the

justification stresses less on ideology and more on access to resources for food and
development.
As to the prospects for regional negotiations on the Spratlys, it is usually
presumed that a multilateral conference could produce a meaningful and
enforceable agreement given the multi-party character of the dispute. But obstacles
can beset this. Convening a forum to launch formal negotiations can be difficult. The
parties must first accept the status quo as basis for the negotiations. This might lack
its appeal to the claimants. For instance, the Philippines and Malaysia might
entertain such discussions quite readily, but China, Taiwan and Vietnam cannot do
so. It must be remembered that Taiwan controls only one island and cannot be
expected to gain much from the multilateral negotiation. China, on the other hand,
prefers to engage in bilateral discussion with the Philippines or Malaysia but will not
aircraft guns and radar systems for monitoring aircraft and ships in the area and for guiding cruise
missile systems throughout the China Sea.
136
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negotiate with Vietnam. China will likewise not negotiate with Taiwan in any
multilateral discussion. They both lay claim on the Spratlys in the name of “China”
on the same historical bases. If they enter into negotiations, it would be like
recognizing two “Chinas” and their claim will tend to cancel out each other’s claims.
Vietnam, on the other hand, tends to target negotiations mainly with China and
also prefers the bilateral approach. Vietnam originally claimed sovereignty over all
archipelagos in the South China Sea and holds the largest number of islets with
military presence, but lost the Paracels to China in 1974. Vietnam appears ready to
hold on to the Spratlys and believe that China must concede to its claim to maintain
regional stability. Participation by both Vietnam and China in negotiations is
therefore essential to obtain diplomatic solutions. They both have the longest
historical claims and they have exercised the strongest resolve to use military force
upholding their claims. It would be reasonable then for Vietnam and China to first
negotiate between themselves as a precondition before proceeding to negotiations
with other claimants. While both may insist for the other to leave the archipelago
completely or to agree to partition the South China Sea as between them, this will
just produce a deadlock and the claims of the other states will likewise be
encroached upon. To illustrate, if both claims sovereignty one claim will be upheld
and the other will be denied. Or if they compromise, it will depreciate the legitimacy
of their historical claims and enhance the claims, say of the Philippines and
Malaysia.137
In the future, China will remain predominant in the Spratlys archipelago and
throughout South China Sea as technology, a growing economy, and an
increasingly blue water naval capability have given China motives for its policies in
the region, namely, potential oil exploitation and expanded maritime rights. It
likewise has the means to execute policies such as on-site naval installations and
enhanced military capabilities. The pressure for China to increase its industrial base
comes from the increasing resource demands of its growing population of 1.4 billion
plus people, which demands for more goods and services. A fuel for this is new
energy sources such that efforts will be made to explore and exploit offshore
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petroleum services with the use of military force if necessary to protect and support
their operations.
Even if all parties agree to negotiate base on the status quo, the fundamental
problem remains as to how to apportion the contested islands and adjacent sea
areas among the claimant states to the satisfaction of all.

It is not only the

sovereignty issue and the conflicting claims, which are uncertain and complicates
the issue but also the number of islands, cays, reefs, and atolls actually present
since many smaller formations remain submerged at high tide. While it is easy for
governments to make claims, it is complicated and difficult to substantiate the
presence and exact location of these various land formations in the South China
Sea.
Knowing the complicated considerations for these territorial conflicts,
governments will have to accept trade-offs and compromises that lead to mutual
benefit and cooperation. This leads us to a discussion in the next Chapter of the
approaches to resolving the dispute.
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CHAPTER 6
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE DISPUTE AND
NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT

“The efforts to manage the potential conflicts were motivated by the conviction that
cooperation was better than confrontation and that talking about cooperation was better
than preparing for a fight.”
- Hasjim H. Djalal138

Articles 2(3) and (4) of the United Nations Charter states that member States
have two parallel obligations: first, “to settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not
endangered”; and second, to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.
It is the customary duty of States to cooperate with other States on
transboundary matters in good faith, and to use these resources in a reasonable
and equitable manner.139 Treaty law also mandates states to enter into cooperation
arrangements whenever there is a dispute or conflict, under Article 73(3) and 84(3)
of the 1982 LOS Convention. Provisional agreements could be established pending
final determination issues in the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.
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What prospects does contemporary international law offer for settling a
dispute as complex as this case?
Article 33 of the UN Charter of which the parties involved in this dispute are
signatories states that:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek
a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council shall, when it
deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such
means.
The Security Council should be excluded as it may be seen as lacking the
necessary objectivity required on a decision-making organ, given the fact that China
is a permanent member with the right to veto. Although there is a call for abstention
of a party who is involved in the dispute in Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter, it
cannot be denied that members involved in a dispute have considerable power and
influence.
International law requires states to negotiate. The development and
reinforcement of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) favour such negotiations, but it cannot depend on the ASEAN or
third parties. Negotiations depend on the will of the parties themselves to negotiate.
The position of China in the case of the Paracel Islands that there is nothing
to negotiate makes the prospect of negotiation highly unlikely. China is of the
position that there is nothing to negotiate and holds the archipelago by military force
on the basis of sovereignty. In the case of the Spratly islands, the bilateral and
multilateral meetings have prompted China to reserve the issue of sovereignty and
to negotiate a formula, which would allow the States concerned jointly to develop the
natural resources in the area.
As to recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), matters can only be
referred to it when the parties agree especially for multilateral disputes. Access to
the ICJ is voluntary and it is up to the states to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of
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the ICJ, which is equivalent to recognizing the jurisdiction of the judicial organ of the
United Nations. At present, only the Philippines recognizes the Court’s jurisdiction
but not for dispute involving the Kalayaan area. The Philippines expressed intention
to bring the dispute before the United Nations but China rejected the Philippines
proposal to submit the dispute to any agency or tribunal. China declared that the
dispute should be settled through bilateral negotiations. China is not likely to accept
the jurisdiction of the ICJ because this process will internationalize the dispute and
run counter to its preferred strategy of dealing with each of the other claimants on an
individual basis.140 Another point is that the ICJ has jurisdiction to resolve legal
disputes only. The present case involves not just legal issues but also political,
economic, social and legal concerns.141
Disputes over maritime delimitation could be brought to the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea but without the mutual consent of all parties,
obstacles exist to using the Tribunal.
A special agreement that defines the terms of the dispute between the
parties may bring the dispute before the Court (or any international tribunal which
the states may wish to approach), which could result in a binding decision. Under
this scheme, two or more states among themselves may agree to bring the matter
before the Court. For the Spratlys, a special agreement between any two of the six
contenders will be a powerful tool to trigger general proceedings in the ICJ for a
settlement.
It may not be possible to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court unilaterally and
for one state to benefit from its decision while it will be disadvantageous for the other
claimants. It may be the case that jurisdiction over the islands will be settled without
them and to their disadvantage, or by intervening would become party to the
proceedings so that they can set out their rights and protect them. The whole case
of the Spratlys would be brought before the Court. The Court’s task will not be easy
and will require a lot of effort demanding utmost cooperation of the parties. It is
likewise difficult to predict how the ICJ might rule in a complex case like this.
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6.1 Joint Resource Development and Cooperative Arrangements
Attempts to delimit EEZs and continental shelves need not necessarily
involve, or only involve, the drawing of a boundary line.142 Since recourse to the ICJ
or a tribunal seems farfetched at this time, the creation of a joint authority to
common development of resources within the Spratlys area may be more appealing
to the claimants as a reasonable solution to the sovereignty disputes. Pending
settlement of territorial and/or jurisdictional disputes, claimant States must be able to
benefit from the resource of the disputed area as well as manage disputed area
without having to give up their basic claims.143 Through a range of different
arrangements, power will be shared to achieve a compromise solution, an
international collaboration restricted to the management of a single space. One such
collaboration will be the establishment of a “Spratlys Resource Development
Authority” (SRDA).144
It is essential that the parties agree to set aside, without prejudice, their
claims to the Spratlys when they jointly form this SRDA to manage exploitation of
resources, which includes fisheries, environment, and safety of navigation. This will
correspond with the “Authority” for mining the deep seabed in the 1982 LOS
Convention.
Another form of solution is the establishment of a condominium, a legal
regime established by treaty, under which several States could jointly exercise over
a single territory the powers normally exercised by a single state.145 A condominium
over the Spratlys in the form of an international joint development agency will have a
two-fold objective: first, to secure the safety of navigation in the region by
maintaining buoys and lighthouses; and second, to manage the resources of the sea
or seabed which, belongs to the holder of title to sovereignty over land above sea
level under the 1982 LOS Convention.
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This will be consistent with the position of China that while their claim to
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands is non-negotiable, joint ventures to exploit
natural resources of the South China Sea may be allowed.146 It was proposed by
Prime Minister Li Peng that the disputes be set aside so that joint development may
be applied. The problem with this proposal is that it is based on the premise that the
South China Sea belongs to China which is the premise for all Chinese solutions.
This proposal serves to legitimize the “nine dotted national boundary line”147 which
encloses over 80% of the surface of the South China Sea.
Another approach which can be adopted is that suggested by Prof. G.M.C.
Valero which he called the maritime approach.148 This is a diplomatic process where
people can negotiate over what can be done in the situation. He said that it would be
helpful if each country defines first what exactly is its position, not only for the
purpose of staking out the legal basis for such claims. A shift in perspective would
be key. He said that states should stop seeing it as a problem of drawing a line in
the middle of the sea. Instead, each state should say the reason for its interest in a
part or an area – resources, security, administrative concerns, etc. For instance, it
will affect its fishing industry or so that an energy program may be developed or may
involve the policy of piracy, drug trade or trafficking and controlling customs. In this
way, the administrative lines will be drawn which will be the core of the maritime
approach and the political will be developed coming from within.
With these suggested approaches, the complicated sovereignty question will
not necessarily be resolved but at least the dispute will become somewhat diffused.
Multinational companies may then be attracted to invest in hydrocarbon
development in the disputed areas. A different situation will not attract the investors,
as the security of their investments will be threatened with an unstable geopolitical
situation.
It is hoped that the establishment of the SRDA, a condominium, or the
maritime approach will serve the interest of all the claimants. If agreed to by the
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parties, this will be an ideal solution and compromise. The authority will be able to
manage the claims of the parties and provide an acceptable mechanism for dispute
resolution, ensure that the zone or area is demilitarized as military presence will
impede the extraction of the resources in the area, and facilitate resource
exploitation which can be every expensive if done so unilaterally.
The genuine willingness of the claimant governments to cooperate is
important for this mechanism to work.149 It is fundamental therefore that the basic
relations of the parties are good as this opens the door for cooperation. Patience
and genuine commitment are also required to integrate legal, financial, economic
and customs arrangements between governments and to successfully implement
any agreement. For instance, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam have cordial if
sometimes shaky relations with each other. This, together with the fact that they are
“fraternal” members of ASEAN virtually guarantees at least readiness to discuss the
Spratly issue. China is cultivating better relations with ASEAN governments.
However, its relations with Vietnam, an ASEAN member is not all that good. This
could complicate the designed cooperation especially in disputes involving the
Paracels and Spratly Islands, as well as China’s overall relations with ASEAN.
Another factor to reduce tension will be the “political pragmatism” of the
150

states.

For instance, when hydrocarbon is in fact discovered in the South China

Sea, China’s domestic needs for hydrocarbon energy could override antagonistic
political considerations and therefore open the door for a joint development
arrangement. The strongest reason to motivate a government to undertake a joint
management arrangement is the perceived sense of urgency or obligation to protect
its interests in potential oil or gas deposits, combined with a desire to maintain or
solidify good relations with other state(s).
Another factor for the success of the cooperation would be the degree of
knowledge on the resource deposits in the area. If little is known about the
hydrocarbon potential, the disputed area will be easier to apportion than if
substantial proven deposits had already been discovered. If it were the latter case,
each side will realize that it must give something away and that could dissuade them
from serious negotiations. It is custom that governments are more likely to opt for a
joint resource development when each is unwilling to give up a larger share, the
149
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extent of the resource deposits are unknown and neither side knows how much it
could lose.
Joint development is neither permanent nor optimal for resolving boundaries
and international jurisdictional disputes over rights to resources. It might even be
provisionally established. But in some cases, it may be the only alternative to no
action at all – and thus no resource development – or, worse, to confrontation and
conflict. Joint development will look increasingly attractive as more oil is needed, or
new deposits discovered by disputant government and successful precedents for
cooperative arrangements occur.

6.2 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) as Preventive Diplomacy
To launch negotiations aimed at establishing a joint resource development
authority for the South China Sea, it is of utmost necessity that there is confidence
and transparency between the governments of the involved states who are
members of Southeast Asia and China. Confidence and trust among fellow
governments are critical for progress in negotiations.
The disputants must become involved in constructive negotiation aimed at
solutions for satisfying their different interest through peaceful means. It cannot be
denied that the overlapping jurisdictional claims, persistent military occupation of
islands, aggressive military spending and the leasing of the disputed areas to
international petroleum companies have all combined to aggravate the tension
among the states. From this awareness of the regional tensions must come the
necessity of maintaining an order in the South China Sea, one that is predicated on
accepted rules of international law, which rules at the same time will accommodate
the disparate national interests at stake.

The disputants must therefore involve

themselves in constructive negotiations aimed at solutions for satisfying their
different interests through peaceful means.
An important first step according to Joyner and Morada is the pursuit of
confidence building measures (CBMs).151 Through CBMs, functional cooperation
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and direct communication could be fostered among the claimants as a means to
preclude territorial disagreements from escalating into military confrontation.
Measures for building confidence can lead to a better climate for negotiations and
more positive results. Since international negotiations between governments involve
people with emotions, deeply held values and perceptions, which are highly
unpredictable, CBMs will make the political climate more conducive to certainty
where it engenders working relationships with trust, understanding and respect to
make the negotiations easier, more efficient and more constructive. It can also
contribute to raising sensitivities about other negotiators’ national interests and
constraints on their negotiating positions affecting particular issues.
For genuine confidence to be promoted, governments must understand the
motives and rationales behind the policies of other states in the region, and this can
only come from increased transparency of national policies and capabilities.
Transparency thus becomes key to confidence-building.

6.3 The Indonesian Initiative
The process of CBM among governments involved in the South China Sea
begun more than a decade ago. A regional dialogue on disputes, hosted informally
through a series of Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China
Sea by Indonesia has been convened annually since 1990 through its Department
of Foreign Affairs.152 The Indonesia Initiative153 aims to foster confidence among
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research organizations. Technical working groups are convened to discuss issues affecting

57

South China Sea states through “Track Two Diplomacy”154 in order to ease tensions
arising from sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes over the Spratly and Paracel
Islands.
The Initiative calls for representatives from different states involved in an
international dispute to meet informally and discuss aspects and issues related to
the matter. In so doing, the activity creates an atmosphere of open and free
discussion, without the restrictions imposed by having to maintain official
government positions.
Up to the present time, the South China Sea littoral states have been able to
identify issue-areas for potential cooperation. These include marine scientific
research, marine environmental protection, safety and sea communications,
fisheries assessment and development, defense and security issues, territorial and
jurisdictional issues (other than claims to islands and ocean space), and creation of
institutions for cooperation.155
The Indonesian workshops represent the most serious regional effort thus far
for promoting peace and cooperation in the South China Sea. The process is geared
towards informal diplomacy, with the expectation that complete agreements on an
issue can be returned to normal inter-governmental diplomatic channels for eventual
negotiation. The process is informal and offers participants the advantage of greater
freedom to discuss ideas. The tendency is to promote opportunities for consensus
by avoiding adversarial situation. For instance, there is no discussion of sovereignty
over the Spratlys, or conflicting claims to jurisdiction over ocean space, or
continental shelf drilling rights since they also know that agreement will not be
forthcoming anyway and to do so could seriously risk disrupting the entire
cooperative process.
It was at the first meeting of the Technical Working Group on Legal Matters,
which met in Phuket, Thailand in early July 1995 where the participants agreed that
the 1982 LOS Convention offered a suitable means for fostering cooperation among
South China Sea littoral states, particularly in terms of the framework regime for
semi-enclosed seas.

cooperation and issues raised at these meetings are then re-circulated back to the annual workshop
plenary meeting and adoption.
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This has been further bolstered in the Ninth Workshop wherein it was
decided that cooperation on South China Sea issues would be continued through
the workshop’s projects. New developments from the 1998 Workshop included
agreements to convene special meetings by the Committee for the Coordination of
Offshore Prospecting to compile data on non-hydrocarbon mineral resources in the
South China Sea and by the Study Group on Zones of Cooperation to examine the
prospects for joint cooperation and development. In addition, the Legal Matters
Group would be charged with discussing the possible content of various codes of
conduct that might be applied to activities in the region.156
As a result of the regional cooperative activities generated by the Indonesian
workshops, a strategy of confidence-building is in progress and is producing tangible
results. It is however, admittedly slow, ponderous and piecemeal. Nevertheless, the
committee discussion has provided participants the opportunity to air their views and
thus compel claimant governments to recognize differences of opinion.

It is

important that workshops involve a process aimed toward regional cooperation, not
a quick fix for demilitarization of and joint resource development in the South China
Sea.
While the results of the Indonesian Initiative remain limited, this fact has not
diminished the political significance of these meetings.

6.4 Models for Resource Development Agreements
A number of resource development arrangements have been successfully
negotiated in the 20th century which could serve as models for managing resource
development in the South China Sea and can ultimately serve as a key to
negotiating an agreement. Examples of these model agreements are the AustraliaIndonesia Timor Gap Agreement, the Spitzbergen (Svalbard Treaty) Arrangement
and the Antarctic Treaty. Each of these arrangements was chosen because they
deal with issues of like nature as the South China Sea issues, namely: issues of
disputed sovereignty, maritime jurisdiction, geostrategic considerations and access
to natural resources. Each case involved the following salient points: contentious
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claims of sovereignty to the same territory; access to and exploitation rights of
potential mineral resources; a package deal approach wherein no crippling
reservations were permitted that might undercut or dilute the legitimacy of the
agreement or the participation of any party to it; non-resolution of the sovereignty
dispute which was instead put aside so that cooperation through the agreement
might be allowed to work; creation of a special mechanism to make policies for the
arrangement and to deal with disputes that might arise between parties; inclusion of
efforts to enhance transparency of the governments’ policies affecting activities in
the region; and, successful negotiation by the political willingness of all claimants
and inclusion of non-claimants to compromise on what had been highly
unchangeable, nationalistic positions.157
Much can be learned from these arrangements on how it treated the
sovereignty issue and how it apportioned the rights, duties and obligations between
the parties. It is particularly helpful in giving lessons on how to resolve or at least
mitigate disputes that involve sovereignty as with the South China Sea.

6.4.1 The Australia-Indonesia Timor Gap Agreement158
The Timor Gap Treaty is remarkable for its “zone of cooperation”
approach,159 which should appeal to the Spratly Islands claimants. In this
157

Supra, Footnote 3, Joyner at p. 84-88.
Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area
Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia entered into force in
February 1991.
159
Articles 2 (2b) and 4 (1b) of the Timor Gap Agreement stipulates for the Zone of Cooperation in
the disputed seabed area between East Timor and Australia. The area covers 60,000 square
kilometres (23,000 square miles). In Zone B, the area closest to Australia, Australia pays to
Indonesia ten percent of the Gross Resource Rent Tax collected from petroleum production.
Similarly, Indonesia makes analogous payments to Australia from the Contractor’s Tax collected
in Area C, the portion nearest to Indonesia. Zone Area A, the central and largest portion of the
Zone possessing the greatest potential for hydrocarbons, is made subject to a joint development
regime.
Responsibility for managing Zone Area A is delegated to Ministerial Council comprised of
an equal number of representatives from both States. A joint Authority, accountable to the
Council, manages petroleum exploration and exploitation activities and is responsible for
environmental management as delegated by the Treaty’s provisions and the regulations issued by
the Ministerial Council. Articles 14-17 of the Agreement also provides for cooperation in Area A
in matters of search and rescue, air traffic services, and protection of the marine environment.
Article 20 of the Agreement requires the parties to negotiate agreement on the exploitation of
petroleum accumulations that overlap boundaries of Area A. This Zone of Cooperation will be in
158
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arrangement, various zones could be set out according to various jurisdictional
claims, but with an outlook taken by the parties that special sovereign prerogatives
could not be attached to any zones.

The Timor Gap Treaty has a two-tier

management structure that requires close cooperation between the parties,
especially for reaching consensus on decision at each level. It likewise demands
high level integration and interdependent procedures. Disagreements could
jeopardize the entire treaty relationship. Even if consensus making will not be easy
as there are six parties participating in the arrangement, any decision reached will
be taken as binding and unequivocal.
The clean slate approach (not to recognize previously claimed rights)
adopted by the Timor Gap Treaty can be appealing to the Spratly claimants. In this
way, no claimant state would be put at a diplomatic or political disadvantage, and all
governments would gain economic access or tax revenues by participating in the
agreement. This should however be carried out in an exclusively peaceful manner.

6.4.2 The Spitzbergen (Svalbard Treaty) Agreement 160

The Svalbard Treaty creates a regime of equity treatment in the exploitation
of resources of Svalbard for all parties, which currently number forty. 161
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force for forty years, and may be renewed for successive terms of twenty yeas if no permanent
agreement is reached on continental shelf delimitation. The incentive thus is depreciated fro
producing a permanent settlement, particularly if it could lead to collapse of the interim agreement
that now works satisfactorily for both parties.
Treaty Relating to Spitzbergen (Svalbard). Svalbard is a cluster of glaciated islands in the Arctic
Ocean lying 645 kilometers (400 miles) north of Norway, consisting of the Spitzbergen group and
several smaller islands. The discovery of extensive mineral and coal deposits in the late 9th
century prompted several states to stake claims in the Svalbard. Among these states are Sweden,
Denmark, the Soviet Union and the United States. As a remedy to this conflicting and numerous
claims, the Treaty Relating to Spitzbergen (Svalbard Treaty) was negotiated in 1920.
Three special purposes are specially articulated in the Treaty. First, it places the Svalbard
archipelago under the sovereignty of a single state, Norway, so that the island would be subject to
proper legal regulation. The package-deal nature of this arrangement works like this: Norway did
not grant rights to other states and Norway was given sovereignty over Svalbard on condition that
other states retained their previous extensive terra nullius economic rights. Neither did the Treaty
give any indication that Norwegian sovereignty is of an inferior quality compared to the
sovereignty of other states over their territory. The second purpose of the Svalbard Treaty is to
ensure preservation of rights that other states had for an exploitation of the archipelago’s economic
resources under the prior legal status of terra nullius. This is accomplished by ensuring equal
access to economic activities and by requirements that all taxes collected be used on Svalbard,
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A major innovation of the Svalbard Treaty that might be useful in the Spratlys
is its approach towards conflicting sovereignty claims. In this treaty, the participating
parties were granted permanent terra nullius economic rights. While the Spratly
claimants might have problems granting to any other single Spratly claimant
sovereignty over the entire archipelago, it is more likely that a management authority
might be established that grants each party equal access rights to the area.
Provisions of this Treaty leave unanswered questions pertaining to
jurisdiction offshore, geographical application of exploitation principles to the EEZ
and continental shelf jurisdictions generated by archipelago or does it extend to
marine areas beyond the territorial sea. These questions have direct bearing on the
resolution of the Spratly Islands dispute if a joint resource development authority is
to be devised for the South China Sea area.

6.4.3 The Antarctic Treaty 162
The Antarctic Treaty was principally designed to promote scientific
cooperation in the region. The Treaty expressly stipulates legal obligations banning
military activities and nuclear weapons in the area, as well as guarantees for
freedom of scientific research and cooperation and the obligation to settle disputes
peacefully.
Important principles flow from the Antarctic Treaty with respect to the Spratly
situation. Article I provides for a system of unannounced, on-site inspection by any
party of another party’s Antarctic vessels or research stations to verify that Treaty
obligations are being met. A similar type of inspection system might be especially
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provided under Article 8 (2). Lastly, the Treaty aims to secure peaceful development on the
islands. This can be easily secured if the first and second purposes are achieved.
The Antarctic Treat, signed December 1959, entered into force June 1961. Portions of Antarctica
have been claimed by seven states - the United Kingdom, Australia, France, New Zealand,
Norway, Chile and Argentina. The Antarctic Treaty had to address delicate political
considerations created by the ambiguous sovereignty claims held by states with mutually
antagonistic interests in the region. The claims of Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom
entirely overlapped on the continent and the question of sovereignty has constantly threatened to
disrupt international cooperation in the south polar area. The Treaty was produced after the
International Geophysical Year wherein participating Governments were convinced of the
desirability of preserving the international cooperation in Antarctic affairs.
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useful for building confidence among regional states in negotiation for a Spratly
development regime.
Article IX provided for the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), a
special decision-making body that includes signatory states that have acquired
policy-making authority under the Treaty. This group and its legal activities are selfcreating, self-implementing and self-administering.
Of particular interest to the Spratly Islands claimants is the manner in which
Article IV163 of the Antarctic Treaty set aside the status of sovereignty on the
continent throughout the duration of the Treaty relationship. It was seen then that
sovereignty issues are factors that might complicate or undermine successful
operation of the agreement. Thus, such questions were shelved. It likewise provides
that no new claim, or enlargement of an existent claim, can be asserted while the
treaty remains in force.

6.5 An Evaluation of the Model Agreements
These agreements demonstrate that international agreements can be forged,
and resource development arrangement can be produced if the parties are willing to
make them happen. But should any state, particularly a key player assume the
bargaining position that it will give away nothing and only take away everything, then
no agreement will be possible. The geopolitical status quo will persist, or possibly
deteriorate. Thus, in each of these successfully-negotiated resource arrangements,
all governments were treated as co-equals, and all compromised to some extent, so
that an agreement could be obtained that better served their national interest,
163

In full, Article IV provides:
1.
Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: (a) a renunciation by any
Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica; (b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claims to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or
those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; (c) prejudicing the position of any
Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other State’s right of or
claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2.
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a
basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. No
new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial in Antarctica shall be asserted
while the present Treaty is in force.
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specially by creating a climate of cooperative coexistence and shared expectations
with the other parties. The key to the negotiating process was mutual trust and
confidence with a workable outcome for all parties. No lasting agreement will be
possible absent the political will to compromise positions so that the sovereignty,
resource and sharing concerns of all parties can be accommodated.
Admittedly, it would not resolve the sovereignty problem in the South China
Sea nor would it shed light on how to arrive at a solution for the sovereignty question
as it dodges the issue of sovereignty. It will even delay the time when the
sovereignty question has to be addressed.
Nonetheless, the issue of sovereignty would not encroach upon cooperation
in developing resources in the South China Sea. In fact, it will provide a framework
for cooperation among the parties and permit the participating governments equal
access with equal rights in managing resources in the region. Through an
arrangement such as this, habits of cooperation and trust, which will lead to
collaborative relationships among states, will be formed among the claimant States
in the South China Sea.
Moreover, as it avoids the issue of sovereignty, the position of every party is
preserved and they can participate in the treaty with other parties who espouse
adverse legal positions. The Treaty permitted states to disagree on the issue of
sovereignty without jeopardizing the treaty’s ability to function.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
“The water in itself is a very dynamic resource. You cannot really subdivide it
and say one boundary excludes the others. It is a fluid resource. It is a means
of connecting people and not dividing them.”
- Gerardo Martin C. Valero

7.1 Summary
As elucidated in the introductory Chapter, the issue of maritime boundary
delimitation is said to be the most problematic of the regional issues and concerns of
the states in the South China Sea which is made more intense and complicated with
the discovery of oil and gas reserves and the presence of other natural resources.
The geopolitics in the South China Sea was therefore discussed in Chapter 2
providing therein not only a description of the geography and other environmental
factors (such as the demographic, cultural, and historical conditions), but also an
economic and political description of the area as well.

From the geographic

description, it was revealed that 90% of the South China Sea is rimmed by land and
is surrounded by ten (10) Asian states which are markedly variegated politically, and
economically, namely: the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and
Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan
(ROC). The area includes hundreds of natural formations of small islands, islets,
cays, atolls, rocks, coral reefs, shoals and sandbanks, comprising four main
archipelagos in the South China Sea, namely: the Pratas, Macclesfield Bank,
Paracels, and Spratlys. Eight states claim title to these South China Sea islands:
Singapore and Malaysia has claims over Pisang Island and Pulau Batu Puteh,
located in the waters of Malacca and Singapore Straits. China, Taiwan and Vietnam
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contest each other’s claims to sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, a group of
fifteen islets and several reefs and shoals scattered over a 200-kilometer area in the
middle of the Gulf of Tonkin. Taiwan also contests China’s claims to Pratas Islands
and the Macclesfield Bank. As for the Spratlys, six states assert claims: China,
Taiwan and Vietnam claim the entire archipelago, while the Philippines, Malaysia
and Brunei claim sovereignty over portions of the Spratlys. Except for Brunei, all the
others have established a military presence in the Spratlys.
From the economic and political viewpoint, the significance of the interest in
the South China Sea was discussed in Chapter 3. The South China Sea has its
special geostrategic importance in terms of the existence of natural resources, both
as a source of fisheries resource and energy resource (oil, gas and hydrocarbon),
as a strategic passageway for merchant vessels and strategic passageway for
military vessels, and as possible baselines from which the exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf may be measured against which extends their exclusive
jurisdictional competence over the waters and resources in the South China Sea
region. A discussion of the economics especially on the post-Asian financial crisis
was also included as an important factor for the interest of these states as an
economic crisis or recovery will dictate the military spending of the states. These
factors, which contribute to the interest of the claimants, were considered as a
potential cause or trigger for the competing and conflicting claims in the region.
In Chapter 4, the justifications and basis for the territorial claims of the states
were discussed. It can be observed that interested governments organized and
refined their legal positions to support the validity of their claims in order to provide
justification and ultimately international recognition for their respective territorial and
jurisdictional claims. Claims to sovereignty over territory in the South China Sea are
based on principles of acts of sovereignty, discovery and occupation and on the
continental shelf principle.
An analysis on the tenability of the legal arguments propounded by each of
the claimants was conducted in Chapter 5. These legal arguments propounded by
the claimants were found not to have helped in ending or giving a definite resolution
of the territorial sovereignty issue and even added to the perpetuation of friction
among the disputants.
On the whole, the justification for the territorial claims in the South China Sea
is quite thin. The authenticity of the documentary background has questionable
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authenticity and the historical records are contradictory. None of the claimants offer
an unassailable historical or legal claim. Old historical documents mentioning the
reefs and islands in the South China Sea are unlikely to be helpful in resolving the
disputes in the Paracels and the Spratlys have been at best described as a source
of danger to shipping. The intent therefore was to notify the seafarers about the
dangers in the area and not to claim sovereignty.
Measures that might contribute to the resolution of setting aside of
competing claims in the region were made in Chapter 6. It is submitted that a joint
resource development and cooperative agreement, while not a new approach, is
feasible in this case. It will be the most appealing to the claimants as it does not
require the resolution of the complicated sovereignty and territorial question but the
dispute will be somewhat diffused.

While there is reluctance with the states to

discuss territorial, jurisdictional, political and security issues, there is strong
willingness to develop cooperation. This should be harnessed and developed as the
states can get national benefit from the pursuit of common regional interest.
Three (3) model agreements for resource development were evaluated to
see if an agreement patterned after these three model agreements can be
negotiated. It was surmised that the zone of cooperation approach, the clean slate
approach and scientific cooperation could be adopted in negotiating an agreement
in the South China Sea. With a trend of dodging the issue of sovereignty, it would
nonetheless not encroach upon cooperation in developing resources in the South
China Sea in the meantime that this issue is pending. In fact, it will provide a
framework for cooperation among the parties and permit the participating
governments equal access with equal rights in managing resources in the region,
developing habits of cooperation and trust, which will lead to collaborative
relationships among the claimant states in the South China Sea.

7.2 Conclusion
A claim to sovereignty has been seen as an obstacle to the successful
resolution of the dispute in the South China Sea. Insistence on who has the best
claim to title over islands only deepened the conflict in the region because it
prompted claimants to use military means to improve their position in the area in
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terms of having control over navigation and trade routes in the South China Sea and
it served to support unilateralism as a preferred mode as a more decisive and
effective method to sovereignty. The mad scramble to extend their maritime
competences by getting a piece of a territory by these states, specifying their
maritime limits and granting concessions or licensing projects within the area claims,
is an example of how much premium had been placed on the concept of actual
occupation of the claimed territory with each claimant maintaining a military
presence in at least one of the islands to the archipelago. This militarization of the
area causes grave concern as it can lead to a volatile atmosphere that can trigger a
conflict made apparent by repeated incidents of arrests and counter-arrests of
vessels by agents of competing governments.
Any attempt therefore to resolve the dispute militarily is likely to fail. Military
activities connote a show of force and not a genuine sincerity to resolve contentious
legal issues peacefully and diplomatically. Any attempt to take already occupied
islands by force is most likely to be resisted and has been shown in past military
skirmishes in the region. Claimant governments must therefore restrain the use of
military force in the area.
They should not settle boundary problems through unilateral enactment of
national legislation, as this tends to harden their position, which makes it difficult for
parties to seek a solution.
While it was intimated in one of the Chapters that the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea could serve as a basis for the solution of the disputes to maritime
delimitation as it provides the “main language for conflict resolution”,163 this has not
been the case. This may be attributed to the lack of clarity of some of the UNCLOS
provisions. For instance, under Article 221 the provisions are unclear if in terms of
defining islands, the Spratlys and Paracel areas fulfil the requirements for
generating more than 12 nm territorial sea or if the islets can be rightly considered
as islands or rocks from which the right of the states to generate territorial waters or
an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. If this is answered with clarity, this
will pave the way for giving a solution to the South China Sea dispute. This is not to
say that the 1982 LOS Convention is impracticable in this case. While the law of the
163

Tonnesson, S., ”South China Sea – Islands and the Code of Conduct”, Ocean law and policy series
(vol. 4, nos. 1-2), January-December 2000), University of the Philippines, Institute of International
Legal studies, at p. 94.
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sea has its “limitations to be the basis of providing mechanism and framework for
resolving the dispute, it can serve as a point of departure”.164
Notwithstanding the alarming scenarios, and given the fact that regional
efforts to resolve sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea have not been
successful, multilateral attempts had been made to reach a resolution of all the
competing claims to the South China Sea by exploring alternative approaches for
the settlement of their conflicting claims. The states themselves realized the dangers
that such conflict would create a potential for disrupting international cooperation
and prevent the utilization of maritime resources. This realization is reflected in
agreement among the littoral states known as the “ASEAN Declaration in Manila in
July 1992” (Appendix F) committing states to explore areas of cooperation in the
South China Sea, cooperation for mutual benefit, resolution of the dispute through
peaceful means through dialogue and negotiation, non-use of force to settle
territorial and jurisdictional disputes and the exercise of self-restraint. It is well to add
that the starting point to the negotiation is for the claimants to accept the status quo.
Workshops initiated by Indonesia as a confidence-building measure and
preventive diplomacy will lead to a joint cooperation agreement as talks in these
Workshops made the policies and positions of the States transparent as they were
able to identify issue areas under which the different States will be able to
cooperate. This is an indication that the States are receptive to possibility of
settlement of their conflicting claims by a regional response.
States should be less sensitive to the discussion of the concept of national
sovereignty as “more and more issues of national interests are becoming regional in
implication, like environmental issues, domestic political issues and even monetary
and financial issues”.165 The littoral states should be open to discussions of these
issues in the future and they should do everything possible to settle their land and
maritime jurisdictional boundaries as soon as possible and to respect agreed-upon
boundaries when such had been made in the future.
The situation remains to be one of pessimism for the states to undergo the
process of conflict resolution. Considerable worries are also justified as to matters of
regional security, although an outbreak of war is not to be expected. Pessimism is
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Supra, Footnote 137 at p. 109.
Supra, Footnote 12 at p. 102.
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likewise to be expected especially for the pollution of the marine environment and
over-exploitation of the natural resources in the area. Even in undisputed waters, it
is difficult to patrol fishing grounds and prevent illegal fishing. In disputed waters
such as the South China Sea, this is rendered almost impossible. But realization of
the dangers to the environment might cause the states to bond together. This might
be the basis for regional cooperation and will be the first steps to conflict
management and resolution, which is then a cause for optimism.
Several measures can contribute to transparency and thus build confidence
among the concerned governments in the South China Sea case. For one, claimant
states might consider giving official and informal assurances to restrain the use of
military force in the region. If these official pronouncements are made by
governments in the press or international gatherings, it will provide the public with a
record of the policy declarations and it is more difficult for the government to renege
of those commitments.
Government officials should recognize and respect the national sensitivities
arising from military deployments in the region. While some claimants might not
recognize the legitimacy of other governments’ claims in the region, they must
respect the sensitivities arising from those claims. This they should bear in mind
specially when dealing with the two most intransigent antagonists among the
disputants.
There is need for governments to cease further occupation and annexation
of territory in the Spratlys. Seizing and occupying more islets does little to promote a
government’s strategic position in the region. These features are insignificant as
strategic outposts and hold little value for their natural resources. Moreover, new
occupations

reinforce

suspicion

and

distrust

over

that

government’s

disingenuousness toward future diplomatic negotiations. It seems prudent that
claimant government should accept the status quo as the starting ground for
negotiation.
Military activities connotes show of force and not a genuine sincerity to
resolve contentious legal issues peacefully and diplomatically, government having
claims might reign in efforts to expand military activities in the region. Maritime
military manoeuvres should only be conducted with prior notification of other
governments or to take friendly measures when military exercises are being
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conducted in the region by direct communication and consultation with other
concerned governments.
A common set of operating procedures for navies and air forces of
concerned governments in the disputed region should be devised and coordinated.
This “standardized manual of operations” would lessen tensions by reducing the
likelihood for accidents and minimizing situations that could spark military conflict in
the

region.

The

intergovernmental

collaboration

among

national

military

representatives can likewise foster appreciation for the national interest,
sensitivities, and priorities of their armed forces counterpart in the region.
Finally, means and mechanisms to improve contacts and communications
(e.g. clearer state-to-state hotlines of communications, and hotlines between naval
chiefs) between mainland governments and their local military commanders on
islands occupying islands in the South China Sea might be made to reduce
possibilities of misunderstandings and misperceptions of other governments’ policy
and intentions.

7.3 The Way Forward
The ASEAN-China meeting underscored an achievement that is significant
for both China and the ASEAN member countries, specially the Philippines, with the
signing of the “ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea” (Appendix F). It is significant, as it will give both governments peace of
mind, which is important for the stability and progress of Asia. Instead of being a
major flashpoint, it has become an avenue for shared prosperity. While before the
South China Sea has always been the nexus of the external defense concerns of
both China and the Philippines, now, it can be eased.
Under the declaration, all claimants are committed to resolve their territorial
and jurisdictional disputes through peaceful means without resorting to threat or use
of force in accordance with the recognized principles of international law, including
the 1982 LOS Convention.
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In this code of conduct, the claimants have agreed to hold dialogues and
exchange of views among their defense and military officials. They will also step up
coordinative activities to combat transnational crime and terrorism.
It was the promulgation of the 1998 Hanoi Plan of Action which called for a
regional code of conduct in the South China Sea. The Philippines made a first draft
of the code and shepherded it through various amendments and proposals. By
1999, ASEAN had submitted an initial draft to China. In January 2000, ASEAN
adopted the Philippine proposal to establish a task tem to work further on the code.
By October of the same year, China and ASEAN had come up with three
consolidated texts, each time narrowing the differences between them. The defining
moment came at last at the last Ministerial Meeting in Brunei when ASEAN agreed
in principle to adopt the declaration
The heart and soul of the declaration - the principle of no new occupation
has gained acceptance from all parties.
The Philippines should be recognized in the role it played in moving the
declaration to the point of signing of the parties. Now that there is a more
comprehensive security framework in place, ASEAN and China can now shift their
energies and resources towards broader cooperation in economic and social
development.
But the role of China is likewise crucial. This can be explained by the more
favourable strategic situation which is important in its policy in the South China Sea.
Its policy is to ensure that there in no security threat to its southern border coming
from the United States, Russia or Japan. This concern has been diminished
considerably with the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam in 1975 and
from the Philippines in 1992, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990.
While China also stands as a military power to be reckoned with in the
region, its government had forsaken its intentions of using force to resolve territorial
disputes since this will enhance its political, economic and commercial interests.
Thus, a cooperative engagement with ASEAN states will allay persistent suspicion
and mistrust of its intentions which came about since the Mischief reef incident and
its announcement on 15 May 1996 of its partial baselines for measuring its territorial
sea offshore the mainland and the Paracel Islands. This is just prior to and on the
eve of the scheduled ASEAN-China Dialogue in Bukittinggi in June 1996. This itself
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is problematic since China arrogated for itself the South China Sea as its internal
waters in violation of Article 89 of the 1982 LOS Convention which states that “no
state may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.” If
China opts to draw straight baselines around the Spratlys, it will violate the 1982
LOS Convention provision once again which pertains to islands offshore and
specific geographical situations for which straight baselines along a coast are
permitted. The 1982 LOS Convention does not permit coastal states to draw straight
baselines around small, scattered islands that they claim in the ocean. This right is
reserved only for archipelagic states, to which neither China nor the Spratly Islands
may qualify.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the relations between and among Spratly
claimants are relatively good specially with the signing of the ASEAN-China
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
But there is still need for more non-military mechanisms to keep the peace. A
multilateral fora such as an APEC conference can be used to promote transparency
and mutual exchange of information on regional activities. Through such agreed
upon rules, tensions and conflict can further be contained, minimized or prevented.
Various solutions given may appear Utopian but it is imperative that states
have a sort of solution, which takes into account the interdependence among States.
It is envisaged that states bordering this maritime realm might begin to engage in
collaborative research to complement studies already done individually by countries
or governments. One such topic of common interest and is non-contentious in
nature is marine environmental protection and safety in navigation to foster scientific
and technical cooperation among bordering states while skirting the issue of
territorial claims. As succinctly stated by one author, “a busy international highway of
vital importance to countries far removed geographically from the South China Sea
cannot but be a common heritage of the bordering states that will insure freedom of
navigation and safety at sea to all innocent travellers.”166
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Edgardo D. Gomez, “Marine scientific research in the South China Sea and environmental
security,” Ocean development and International Law (vol. 32, no. 2), London: Taylor and Francis
Ltd., 2001 at p. 205-206.
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APPENDIX A
Table A.1 - Military Clashes in the South China Sea over the Past Two Decades
Date

Countries

Military Action

1976

China, Vietnam

China seized Paracel Islands from Vietnam

1988

China, Vietnam

Chinese and Vietnamese navies clash at Johnson
Reef in the Spratly Islands. Several Vietnamese
boats are sunk and over 70 sailors killed.

1992

China, Vietnam

Vietnam accuses China of drilling for oil in
Vietnamese waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, and
accuses China of landing troops on Da Luc Reef.
China seizes almost 20 Vietnamese cargo ships
transporting goods from Hong Kong from June September.

1994

China, Vietnam

China and Vietnam have naval confrontations within
Vietnam's internationally recognized territorial waters
over oil exploration blocks 133, 134, and 135.
Chinese claim area as part of their Wan' Bei-21
(WAB-21) block.

1995

China,
Philippines

China occupies Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef.
Philippine military evicts the Chinese in March and
destroys Chinese markers.

1995

Taiwan,
Vietnam

Taiwanese artillery fire on Vietnamese supply ship.

1996

China,
Philippines

In January, three Chinese vessels engage in a 90minute gun battle with a Philippine navy gunboat
near Campones Island.

1997

China,
Philippines

The Philippine navy orders a Chinese speedboat
and two fishing boats to leave Scarborough Shoal in
April; Philippine fishermen remove Chinese markers
and raise their flag. China sends three warships to
survey Philippine-occupied Panata and Kota Islands

1998

China,
Philippines

In January, the Philippine navy arrests Chinese
fishermen off Scarborough Shoal.

1998

Philippines,
Vietnam

In January, Vietnamese soldiers fire on a Philippine
fishing boat near Tennent (Pigeon) Reef.

Source: Federation of American Scientists, Military Analysis Network (2000), Spratly Islands,
Retrieved February 12, 2003 from the World Wide Web: http://www.fas.org/man/dod101/ops/war/spratly.htm
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APPENDIX B
Alphabetical Listing of South China Sea Island Reefs

xviii

xix

xx

xxi

xxii

xxiii

xxiv

Source: Valencia, Mark J., Van Dyke, Jon M. & Ludwig, Noel A. Sharing the Resources of the South China
Sea. Hawaii : University of Hawaii Press, c1999. Appendix 1. Retrieved July 09, 2003 from the World Wide
Web: http//www.middlebury.edu/SouthChinaSea/macand/alphabetical.

Individual national claims are listed below English reef names in each respective country's
language and the current occupier may be found in the far right column. Some reefs are
linked to further pertinent information such as photographs of physical installations, other
web-sites, and pictures of the various reefs.

xxv

APPENDIX C

Table C.1 - Disputes over Drilling and Exploration in the South China Sea
Date

Countries

Disputes

1992

China, Vietnam

China signs a contract with U.S. firm Crestone in May to
explore for oil near the Spratly Islands in an area that
Vietnam says is located on its continental shelf, over
600 miles south of China's Hainan Island. In
September, Vietnam accuses China of drilling for oil in
Vietnamese waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.

1994

China, Vietnam

Crestone joins with a Chinese partner to explore
China's Wan' Bei-21 (WAB-21 block. Vietnam protests
that the exploration is in Vietnamese waters in their
blocks 133, 134, and 135.

1996

China, Vietnam

Vietnam leases exploration blocks to U.S. firm Conoco
in April. Vietnamese blocks 133 and 134 cover half the
zone leased to Crestone by China. In May, China
reaffirms a national law claiming the South China Sea
as its own.

1997

China, Vietnam

Vietnamese protest after Chinese Kantan-3 oil rig drills
near Spratly Islands in March. The drilling occurs
offshore Da Nang, in an area Vietnam calls Block 113.
The block is located 64 nautical miles off Chan May
cape in Vietnam, and 71 nautical miles off China's
Hainan Island.

Source: Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for National Strategic Studies and Federation of
American Scientists, Military Analysis Network (2000), Spratly Islands, Retrieved February 12, 2003
from the World Wide Web: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/spratly.htm
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APPENDIX D
Table D.1 – Islands claimed and Occupied by the States
Occupant State
Name of island
Cualteron Reef
China
Da Ba Dao or Whitson Reef
Fiery Cross Reef or Northwest Investigator Reef
First Thomas Shoal
Gaven Reef
Half Moon Shoal
Jackson Reef
Johnson South Reef
Kennan Reef
Ladd Reef
Len Dao Reef
Loaita Cay
Loaita Nan
Mischief Reef
North Reef
Ban Than Jiao
Taiwan
Itu Aba Island
Alison Reef
Vietnam
Amboyna Cay
Barque Canada Reef
Bombay Castle or Rifleman Bank
Cantral Reef
Collins Reef or Johnson North Reef
Cornwalis
Discovery Great Reef
East Reef
(Eldad Reef
Grainger Reef
Lansdowne Reef
Nan Yit Island
Pearson Reef
Petley Reef
Pigeon Reef or Tennent Reef
Prince Consort Bank
Prince of Wales Bank
Sand Cay
Sin Cowe Island
South Reef
Southwest Cay
Spratly Islands
Vanguard Reef
West Reef
Commodore Reef
Philippines
Flat Island
Irving Reef
Lankian Island
Northwest Cay or Shira Islet
Thi Tu Island
West York Island

xxvii

Malaysia

Brunei
No occupants

Ardasier Reef
Dallas Reef
Louisa Reef
Swallow Reef
Louisa Reef
Alicia Annie Reef
Baker Reef
Bombay Shoal
Boxall Reef
Discovery Small Reef
Erica Reef
First Thomas Shoal
Grierson Reef
Half Moon Shoal
Hardy Reef
Higgens Reef
Hopps Reef or Southampton Reef
Hughes Reef
Investigator Reef
Iroquis Reef
Jackson Reef
Livock Reef or Southampton Reefs
Loveless Reef
Menzies Reef
Owen Shoal
Reed Bank
Royal Captain Shoal
Royal Charlotte Reef
Sandy Cay
Scarborough Reef
Tie Shi Jiao
Zhangxi Jiao
Nameless reef between Hughes and Holiday Refs
Two nameless reefs east of Lankian Cay
Two nameless reefs west of Sandy Cay and
Thitu Island

Source: Valencia, Mark J., Van Dyke, Jon M. & Ludwig, Noel A. Sharing the Resources of the South China
Sea. Hawaii : University of Hawaii Press, c1999. Appendix 1. Retrieved July 09, 2003 from the World Wide
Web: http//www.middlebury.edu/SouthChinaSea/macand/alphabetical.
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APPENDIX E
Joint Statement Between China and the Philippines on the
Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-First
Century (16/05/2000)
Joint Statement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines on the Framework of Bilateral
Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century
The People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines have made
great progress in their cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, educational,
scientific and technological and other fields on the basis of equality and mutual
benefit since the establishment of diplomatic relations on 9 June 1975, bringing
concrete benefits to the two peoples.
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as "the two sides") believe that it
is now opportune to establish a framework for further bilateral cooperation.
This new framework will draw on the strength of their long, historical friendship and
geographical proximity in order to advance the fundamental interests of their two
peoples and thereby contribute to peace, security, stability, sustained growth, and
development in Asia and the rest of the world.
The two sides will establish a long-term and stable relationship on the basis of good
neighbourliness, cooperation, and mutual trust and benefit.
They will undertake to elevate China-Philippines relations to greater heights in the
21st century and to this end, state the following:
1. The two sides reaffirm that the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the principles
established in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and
other universally recognized principles of international law are the basic
norms governing the relations between the two countries.
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2. The two sides agree to maintain close and frequent high-level contacts and
exchange of visits at all levels, including government officials, the private
sector, non-government organizations, the academic community, press and
media, and their peoples to contribute to a comprehensive, stable and
sustained development of bilateral relations.
3. The two sides agree to maintain and strengthen the mechanism of annual
meetings between senior officials and their respective foreign ministries for
consultations on bilateral, regional, and international issues of mutual
concern.
4. The two sides agree to make further exchanges and cooperation in the
defence and military fields, strengthen consultations between their military
and defence personnel and diplomatic officials on security issues, to include
exchanges between their military establishments on matters relating to
humanitarian rescue and assistance, disaster relief and mitigation, and
enhance cooperation between their respective strategic and security
research institutes.
5. The two sides acknowledge the similarities in their respective national
development goals, and agree to optimize the use of existing frameworks for
cooperation in the fields of trade, investment, science and technology,
agriculture, education and culture, tourism, civil aviation, and taxation. They
will undertake the following:
a) Promote better bilateral trade and investment flows, and improve
industrial cooperation by:
i. Exploring all possible measures to effect increases in trade
volumes and product choices;
ii. Agreeing to provide a conducive market environment through
identification

and

removal

of

trade

and

investment

impediments;
iii. Improving transparency of trade-related regulations;
iv. Undertaking investment promotion, and joint investment in
third countries; and
v. Encouraging a pro-active role for the business sectors of both
sides.
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b) Intensify exchanges and cooperation in the financial field on the basis
of reciprocity. They will work together for the reform of the
international financial system.
c) Expand scientific and technological cooperation in accordance with
the Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation signed on
14 March 1978, and enter into new areas of cooperation through joint
research, technology transfer and other means.
d) Implement the Agreement on the Cooperation in the Field of
Agriculture signed on 13 September 1999, by promoting economic
and technological cooperation in the agricultural field, increasing data
exchange,

conducting

joint

research,

and

encouraging

their

enterprises, scientific research institutes, and business groups
concerned to take an active part in agricultural cooperation, so as to
bring about common growth of the two economies.
e) Continue

to

implement

the

biennial

executive

programs

in

accordance with the Cultural Agreement signed on 8 July 1979. They
will further enhance their exchanges and cooperation in the fields of
culture, arts, education, film, sports, health care, religion, social
science and book publication through, among others, the exchange
of delegations and art troupes, visits by experts, and exhibitions held
in each other's country.
f)

Further develop bilateral tourism cooperation and expand the tourism
market in an effort to achieve common development of their tourism
industries.

6. Either side shall accord to the other due facilitation in accordance with
international norms so that the nationals of either country who reside, work
or travel in the territory of the other country may receive consular protection
by the appropriate officials of their own country when they are in distress or
involved in legal, labor or other disputes.
7. The two sides will continue to explore new areas for cooperation among their
law enforcement, judicial, security, and defense agencies in order to address
the serious threats posed by organized transnational crimes.
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8. The two sides will continue to provide policy guidance to their respective
national agencies in order to strengthen the role of the various joint
committees in identified areas of cooperation.
9. The two sides commit themselves to the maintenance of peace and stability
in the South China Sea. They agree to promote a peaceful settlement of
disputes through bilateral friendly consultations and negotiations in
accordance with universally-recognized principles of international law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. They
reaffirm their adherence to the 1995 joint statement between the two
countries on the South China Sea and agree not to take actions that might
complicate or escalate the situation. The two sides expressed their
determination to follow through the work of the China-Philippines Working
Group on Confidence Building Measures to enhance peace and stability in
the region. They reiterate that they will contribute positively toward the
formulation and adoption of the regional Code of Conduct in the South China
Sea.
10. The two sides recognize and respect the universality of human rights taking
into account their distinct culture, tradition, and practices. They shall
encourage exchanges and cooperation on human rights on the basis of
equality, mutual respect, with a view to enhancing mutual understanding.
They will work together for the progress and protection of the cause of
human rights.
11. The two sides affirm their commitment to respect the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of each other. The Philippine Government
reaffirms its one China policy and recognizes that Taiwan is an integral part
of Chinese territory.
12. The two sides agree to deepen cooperation between the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
recognizing that close China-Philippines relations contribute to the promotion
of PRC-ASEAN and ASEAN+3 (PRC, Republic of Korea, and Japan)
relations. They will jointly promote dialogue and cooperation in East Asia in
accordance with the Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation issued in
Manila on 28 November 1999 to make a significant contribution to the peace,
stability and prosperity of the region and the world.
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13. The two sides agree to continue their coordination and cooperation at the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Regional Forum, AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation, ASEM, World Trade Organization, United
Nations, and other multilateral fora. They will actively promote and protect
the common interests of developing countries in regional and international
fora, particularly in the areas of trade and finance, human resources
development, and the promotion of the interests of labor, farmers, and
women and children, among others.
14. The two sides agree to promote the establishment of an equitable and
rational world order.
The above statement will be jointly reviewed by the ministers of foreign affairs of the
two sides, if requested by either side.
Done in Beijing, China, on this 16th day of May 2000.

For the Government of the
People's Republic of China:

For the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines:

Tang Jiaxuan
(signed)

Domingo L. Siazon, Jr.
(signed)
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APPENDIX F
ASEAN DECLARATION ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1992
WE, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations;
RECALLING the historic, cultural and social ties that bind our peoples as states
adjacent to the South China Sea;
WISHING to promote the spirit of kinship, friendship and harmony among our
peoples who share similar Asian traditions and heritage;
DESIROUS of further promoting conditions essential to greater economic
cooperation and growth;
RECOGNIZING that we are bound by similar ideals of mutual respect, freedom,
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned;
RECOGNIZING that South China Sea issues involve sensitive questions of
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned;
CONSCIOUS that any adverse developments in the South China Sea directly affect
peace and stability in the region.

-

HEREBY
1. EMPHASIZE the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues
pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to
force;
2. URGE all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a
positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes;
3. RESOLVE, without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries
having direct interests in the area, to explore the possibility of cooperation in
the South China Sea relating to the safety of maritime navigation and
communication, protection against pollution of the marine environment,
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coordination of search and rescue operations, efforts towards combatting
piracy and armed robbery as well as collaboration in the campaign against
illicit trafficking in drugs;
4. COMMEND all parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for
establishing a code of international conduct over the South China Sea;
5. INVITE all parties concerned to subscribe to this Declaration of principles.
Signed in Manila, Philippines, this 22nd day of July, nineteen hundred and ninetytwo.
HRH Prince Mohamed Bolkiah
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
Ali Alatas
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Datuk Abdullah Bin Haji Ahmad Badawi
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MALAYSIA
Raul S. Manglapus
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Wong Kan Seng
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
Arsa Sarasin
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
KINGDOM OF THAILAND
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